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THIS MONTH AND NEXT The December mails brought us so many new subscriptions that we were unable to start all readers with the January issue. Those of you who did not receive a January issue will have your subscriptions commence with the February issue.

Our steady increase in circulation is encouraging and indicates a sincere desire by all Marines to broaden their professional knowledge. No professional can afford not to keep himself abreast of current issues and problems facing the Corps, its officers and men. In the pages of the GAZETTE we attempt to keep you informed and stimulate your interest in the field of military science. Take an active part yourself—write us about your thoughts. Give us your ideas.

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MESSAGE CENTER

Haslam vs Witkowski

... I have just finished reading Maj Witkowski's article (GAZETTE: Nov '57) titled "Half-Cocked." It is extremely interesting, although inaccurate, and after reading and thoroughly digesting it I wonder just who it is that has gone off "half-cocked."

The Major in the second paragraph of his article asks me the question, "Who is we?" This question was raised based upon my statement "... we Marines ... look forward to the days when we assemble at the pistol range to take our turn at cutting out the black." We includes me. Although not a team shooter I, and many more, can honestly state with only 4 days practice shooting and armed with the assembly line .45 caliber pistol with its 6 pound trigger have plunked out a 375 out of a possible 400. Wonder what I, and many others, could do with a match conditioned one?

Then the Major, in his next 4 or 5 paragraphs, states that I am incorrect in concluding (italics mine) that, in the Major's words, "The Old Hand" expert couldn't hit a *moving target* (italics mine) from the crouched position. Maj Witkowski goes on to say, "Once a man gets to be an expert with any weapon, he can shoot that weapon in almost any position and it is a *simple matter* to switch him into any combat position, making him a smaller target and at the same time give him a better chance of hitting his target." First of all, I was not CONCLUDING anything — I stated FACT! Only I was, and still am, talking about moving targets whereas I believe Maj Witkowski is laboring under the assumption that I am referring to the stationary bulls-eye. To elaborate: about 4 years ago we tested a monorail type moving target. From a control box we could regulate the speed of 8, 10 or 12 miles per hour on the movable dolly containing the target. Several fine rifle shooters came out to shoot at it. Over many years of competitive shooting, they had mastered their sight picture, trigger squeeze, breathing, and so forth but when it came time to hit the mov-

ing target ... Well! They couldn't do it. Neither could any of us for a time. However, after several days of firing, knowing the exact range, and setting our sights we did finally manage to register hits on the target; but only after we had learned to inject and coordinate the new aspects of moving with the target as well as taking up the trigger squeeze more rapidly than usual.

Contrary to belief, the fact is that practice on a stationary target, although useful, only makes one competent to hit a stationary target. Just because one masters the stages of shooting Maj Witkowski speaks of does not qualify any man to hit a moving target. It takes much more than that to obtain a hit, be it with a rifle or a hand gun.

Maj Witkowski then jumps to the conclusion that I advocated the elimination of competitive type shooting. I did not say that. What I did say was that we should retain the present course for those who have never fired a hand gun before or who cannot qualify. After that they should move to a practical



training course so they can learn to hit a moving target for a change. After all I do not believe any potential enemy is stupid enough to stand still to be shot.

I reiterate that competitive shooting has its place and is completely foreign when evaluated in light of the principal purpose of the weapon. I go further than that and maintain that programs for competitive type shooting, as we know them, dominate and dictate our policy for marksmanship training and,

as such, inject practices and techniques that do not fully prepare us to become experts in fact.

In closing I must not overlook the statement made by Maj Witkowski that "It makes no difference what position he is in, *even if he stands on his head* (italics mine), by applying these basic principles of good marksmanship he will get a hit." I am forced to take exception to that statement. There is really no need for elaboration; any reader can see why.

CAPT C. B. HASLAM

3dMarDiv, FMF

FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

What Can We Say?

... In the past there has been a great deal of effort exerted towards increasing the membership of the Marine Corps Association. It is gratifying to note that some commands have made noticeable efforts with commendable results. However, the fact remains that our Association still needs more support, both financial and literary.


One of the purposes for which the Association was formed is "to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among members and to provide for their professional advancement." Therefore it behooves all professional Marines, both enlisted and commissioned, to belong and actively support an organization which aims to promote professional advancement.

On one occasion last year when this officer was attempting to persuade a mature, experienced Marine to apply for membership, he refused on the grounds that the Association had failed to accept for publication an article which he had written; then another service eagerly received and published it. So what! That is certainly no reason to consider the Association all wrong. This officer knows many individuals who have spent long hours in preparing articles for the GAZETTE and then had them rejected. Those individuals are not bitter. We must realize that the editorial board has to be extremely selective in choosing material to be printed in the Marine Corps' own magazine; we should consider that the editorial board is in a much better position to judge what is suitable for publication than is an article's author. Even though an article may be excellent, for various and sundry reasons it may not be suitable for publication in the GAZETTE. A magazine is only as good as its contributors.

(Continued on page 5)



The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center



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Is it possible to build a **MAN**?

"Theoretically, yes," said the scientist. "Or a reasonably remarkable imitation—a kind of mechanical analogue. Call it a habit machine, a mechanism operating according to the laws of the conditioned reflex."

You mean that you could actually build a mechanical mind? One that would exhibit emotions—such as love, fear, anger, loyalty?

"We're doing something like that now in advanced missile development," the scientist replied. "In a limited, highly specialized way, of course."

"Take the 'pilot' that is being developed for the big long-range missile. *He* has a wonderful memory, and can solve many complex navigational problems in a flash. *He* loves perfection, and actually becomes highly excited when *he* gets off course. *He's* a tough-skinned character, impervious to the cold at several hundred miles altitude and the incredible heat at re-entry. And *his* loyalty is heroic. *His* life is a single mission, the mission *his* whole life...and maybe ours, too. *He's* a pretty important fellow."

What about the complete man-made Man? What would that entail?

"A mechanism the size of the capitol in Washington, and the best scientific resources in the world. But it could be done. You see, it's only a question of how physical matter is organized. As a great biophysicist explained, 'If material is organized in a certain way, it will walk like a man. If it is organized in another way, it will fly like a missile.'"

Still, wouldn't there be something missing in the complete man-made Man—something very important?

"Yes," said the scientist. "A soul."

MARTIN

BALTIMORE · DENVER · ORLANDO

Marine Corps Gazette • February 1958

(Continued from page 3)

Therefore, I exhort professional Marines of all ranks to join the Marine Corps Association and keep your membership alive. If you think that you have something valuable to contribute to our Corps, then put it in writing and send it to the GAZETTE editor. Our magazine is what we make it, and right now it's the best. Let's keep it that way.

MAJ NORMAN W. HICKS

Junior School
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Physical Fitness

... In his article "Fit to Fight" (GAZETTE: Nov '57) Capt Meeker hit at the heart of the problem of fitness when he said that leaders must keep themselves fit as well as their troops. If a leader is soft himself, he will shun the rigorous training required to toughen his troops.

There's no doubt that the new breed coming from boot camp today is tougher because of the new conditioning program. However, since it takes only 6 weeks to go from champ to chump, the majority of these boots are going to go to pot quickly when they ease into the normal routine of most commands or into the usual pattern of civilian life.

Capt Meeker states that 20 minutes of calisthenics daily will keep one fit. This is a fact. But unfortunately, it is also a fact that most leaders omit this simple but effective method for the traditional afternoon a week of unsupervised "organized athletics," with the excuse that the regular training routine provides adequate conditioning.

The only way to insure that all leaders comply with MCO 6100.3 is for the responsible commanders to require all leaders:

- 1) To test all hands, including themselves, for physical fitness each quarter, and
- 2) To keep a physical fitness profile on each individual, as well as an average profile for the unit.

This requirement should be mandatory not only for regular commanding officers but for reservists as well. After a year of co-operative work with the Delaware National Guard and other Reserve components in a physical fitness program conducted at the YMCA, we have indisputable proof that any reserve CO can get and keep his unit fit to do the job they are presumably being trained for. What's more, it can be done with just 20 minutes of activity on the regular drill night, without equipment, facilities or expense.

It is a problem to achieve fitness but an even bigger problem to maintain it. It's a tough problem because the solution demands self-discipline in place of the self-indulgence that is synonymous with modern living in the US. How-

ever, is any commanding officer, reserve or regular, ever justified in leading unfit men into combat because it's a tough problem to get and keep them fit?

In short, we have to recognize that fitness is somewhat like shaving: unless it is done daily, we soon look like bums.

LtCOL W. P. J. DRAKELEY, JR.
Wilmington, Del.

The Misconstrued Cap

... Due to the brevity of my previous letter (GAZETTE: Jul '57) concerning utility caps, some misconceptions have arisen. I do not advocate copying the head-gear of any foreign military organization, although we are at present wearing caps that were copied from foreign armies in 1918. I do believe that the garrison cap and the utility cap can be replaced by a single Marine Corps hat. I know a jaunty hat or cap can act as a symbol of unit and individual esprit de corps. This can be attested to by those who have fought beside Australians or Royal Marines.

The Marine Corps needs a cap that will have the following features:

- a) Distinctive and easily recognized as belonging to the Marines;
- b) Water repellant, crush proof and washable;
- c) Relatively inexpensive to manufacture.

For example: A nylon cap with a supported crown which embodies our old "sea-going" sweep. Camouflage because of the combat tradition of our Raider-designed camouflage pattern. A scarlet patch and an emblem in front to add color, tradition and identification.

I, also, was initiated into the mysteries of starching and blocking the utility cap "in the Forties." I must admit it left no well of affection in my bosom when the rains came and washed the starch down my neck.

CAPT C. A. BOYD, JR.
2d Mar Div, FMF
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

French Love Knot

... I was glad to learn about the quatrefoil in LtCol Magruder's article in the November 1957 GAZETTE.

I thought everyone knew that the "French Love Knot" (quatrefoil to you) was worn so that "even the angels above would know that the man underneath the cap was a United States Marine."

COL ROBERT A. MCGILL
Hq 1st Mar Div, FMF
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

The New Drill

... The close order drill adopted some months ago is hardening in the FMF arteries at a tender age. Only a segment of the Marine Corps is receiving adequate instruction and application in its

principles. In many cases, especially in support units, qualified instruction is handicapped by training schedules in which even minimum drill periods are sometimes overlooked.

Unfamiliarity is the result and the cause of much negative comment in the ranks. Everything is blamed from poor instruction to awkward construction of the movements themselves. Those who have seen the drill well performed at Marine Corps Schools can refute such arguments, but it is difficult to change a Marine's opinion when he troops and stomps for as little as 4 hours a month.

Officer Candidates and Basic School students receive over 200 hours of instruction and application before they are considered conversant enough to perform and teach close order drill. But there are enlisted personnel who do not



know the new drill who will serve an entire hitch in the FMF without putting in one half that amount of time on the drill field.

Troops ask how they can be expected to achieve proficiency without sufficient practice and supervised instruction. The manual does not answer that one.

The hours and expense invested in the new system were not expended to have something that looks good on paper or that a select few can perform for show. Somewhere in the higher echelons of command there should be a major decision on this presently untenable situation. Positive action is in order or those who date back to the "Old Corps" may be deprived of their heritage of being second to none on the drill field.

2dLt R. M. BLEIWEISS
2d Mar Div, FMF
Camp Lejeune, NC

"Look See" Experts

... Of recent years there has been a plethora or shall we say, virtual avalanche of books on the USSR. Nine out of ten visitors to the USSR take a quick "look see" and become a self-styled expert.

I just had the pleasure of reading *Red Plush and Black Bread*, written by Marguerite Higgins. Its factual data and impressions, based on Miss Higgins' background as a newspaper woman,

have given me an insight into what is truly going on in the Soviet Union.

The book tells about the USSR and its people as they are today. Because the Soviet Union is such a threat to our security and world peace, we have to know more about it. This is much more than merely the source of numerical power or weakness, it conveys the true feelings of the peasant, the factory worker and the "Big Shot Communist."

Socrates once said, "Know Thyself." If the same philosopher were a member of the US Armed Forces today he would probably say, "Know Thy Enemy and Thyself."

CPL J. L. McDONALD
3d Mar Div, FMF
FPO, San Francisco

Rebuttal

... When we eliminate all the administrative equipment and O1 personnel from below the division level I believe that our regimental commanders, battalion commanders, and company commanders will be faced with the same problem that George Washington had in 1785, i.e.

"In my last, by the Marquis de la Fayette, I gave you reason to believe that when I was more at leisure, you should receive a long letter from me; however agreeable this might be to my wishes, the period it is to be feared, will never arrive. I can with truth assure you, that at no period of the war have I been obliged to write half as much as I now do, from necessity. I have been enquiring for sometime past, for a person in the character of Secretary or clerk to live with me; but hitherto unsuccessfully. What with letters (often of an unmeaning nature) from foreigners. Enquiries after Dick, Tom, and Harry who may have been in some part, or at sometime, in the Continental service. Letters, or certificates of service for those who want to go out of their own State. Introductions; applications for copies of Paper; references of a thousand old matters with which I ought not to be troubled, more than the Great Mogul, but which must receive an answer of some kind, deprive me of my usual exercise; and without relief, may be injurious to me as I already begin to feel the weight, and oppression of it in my head, and am assured by the faculty, if I do not change my course, I shall certainly sink under it." (Italics supplied)

There has been a lot of talk about unnecessary paper work and evidently some individuals believe that all paper work is unnecessary.

CAPT HENRY B. LEBOUF, JR.
H&S Bn, MCRD
PI, SC



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DEPENDABLE. SCHEDULED SERVICE SAVES MILLIONS OF VALUABLE MAN HOURS FOR THE MILITARY

two ways to organize a

By Col J. C. Murray



Joint Task Force

On 15 September 1950, with the shattering suddenness of a bursting shell, the Inchon landing exploded behind the enemy forces in Korea. Gen MacArthur's magnificent gamble paid handsome dividends. The course of the war in Korea was reversed. In 10 swift days the North Korean People's Army which had been knocking at the threshold of victory, was broken. In Gen MacArthur's words, "The Navy and the Marines never shone more brightly" . . . Time for planning this vast and indescribably complex amphibious venture—23 days.



Six months earlier, in March 1950, in Exercise PORTREX, a reduced strength division landed amphibiously at Vieques, Puerto Rico. Time for planning this modest peacetime training exercise—7 months from receipt of the directive by the Invasion Commander.

Principal factor accounting for the difference in times required to plan these 2 operations—the command arrangements.

Based upon this dramatic evidence of the relative effectiveness of the two systems for command and organization of forces in a Joint Task Force it might reasonably be assumed that the Inchon design would be universally accepted. Strangely, this is not the case. On the contrary, this salt encrusted design for victory is under constant attack by the proponents of the PORTREX fetish. True, this is largely an academic discussion; the almost talismanic *Beau Ideal* of PORTREX is not at home in the combat zone. In no instance during the Korean war were military forces organized according to this design. This does not mean that no Joint Task Force operations were conducted. Actually there were several, but they did not use the system of command and organization of forces which is held in such high esteem by some of our military academicians.

At Inchon the commander of one of the Service components conducted the operation as a whole, as well as commanded directly the forces of his own military Service. In the PORTREX *Beau Ideal* an additional headquarters with a neuter commander and a hybrid staff was set up to command the operation as a whole.

To show empirically the weakness of the *Beau Ideal* in contrast to the type of command and organization of forces normally used in the amphibious operation is not easy, for,




FIGURE 1

as indicated earlier, the *Beau Ideal* seldom shows itself outside the Pentagon and the staff schools where it need not face a truly realistic appraisal. But this complex structure was erected in Exercise PORTREX.

In this exercise there was established a Joint Task Force Commander and a Joint Staff—complete with all the trimmings. It took months to get the Joint Staff numbering some 70 officers set up—individuals arriving from all points of the compass without so much as a lead pencil to their names. They did not know their staff associates and to get this heterogeneous group organized into a functioning entity was a long time job. Nevertheless, within a period of about 5 months this staff produced a very creditable operation order. But it was one which did little more than set a framework within which the subordinate commanders—the real operational commanders—could start their planning. And here is the payoff. When it

came to the landing, the heart of the whole enterprise, this was placed under the operational control of the Amphibious Task Force Commander. Wisely, too, for no one else could have conducted it so well. Indeed no one else could have conducted it at all. But since this is so patent why not recognize it at the start and let it be reflected in the command arrangements and in the organization of forces?

Here are the words of the Joint Task Force Commander for PORTREX. "The most complicated task, of course, was the one required of the naval component. It was for this reason that the naval component commander was placed in command of the Joint Assault Force, a task force formed to coordinate and control directly under me, all activities, including air, in the objective area during the critical assault landing phase. This force was dissolved immediately after the lodgement was effected." All this is a strong suggestion that in operation PORTREX there was a fifth wheel in the command structure—the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

This is not a discussion of organization at the theater level. The principle of unity of command at this level was established by the National Security Act of 1947. The doctrine prescribing a unified commander with a joint staff made up of officers from the several military Serv-



Col Murray was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1936. In 1942 he was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 1st MarDiv. During the battle for Okinawa he commanded a battalion in the 1st MarDiv. With the onset of war in Korea, he went to the Far East and served on the planning staff of the United Nations Command. During the Korean War he was liaison officer between the Armistice Delegation of the UN Command and the delegation of the North Korean Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. He has served as Chief of Staff, 3d MarDiv and CO, 9th Marines.

ices and supported by Service components under their respective commanders is workable.

Nor is this a discussion of the need for unity of command in Joint Task Force operations. If there is need for such unity at the theater level, how much greater it is in joint operations where armed forces organized, trained and equipped to fight in different media—land, sea and air—are brought together in the face of the enemy in closely coordinated action designed to achieve a common goal!

This does not mean that all combat operations are, or should be, joint in this intimate sense. Take Korea again, for example. There the Eighth Army conducted the land war while the Fifth Air Force conducted the air war, provided air defense and cooperated with the Eighth Army in providing close support to the troops on the ground. Both were responsible to the theater commander, who, balancing the requirements of the air war against those of the ground war, could direct any shift in emphasis he thought desirable. So far as command goes—not necessarily techniques and procedures—that arrangement was satisfactory. Operations in Korea were not normally joint in the sense of a closely integrated Army-Air Force-Navy effort in a discrete combat task. When these circumstances arose as they did in the landings at Inchon and Wonsan, Joint Task Forces were established. At other times the unified theater commander provided the necessary coordination between essentially coequal air and ground commanders in Korea.

What we are talking about then is not the principle of unity of command in Joint Task Force operations, but the method of achieving it.

First, what is a Joint Task Force? According to JAAF (Joint Action Armed Forces), the bible of the military Services on joint action, it is a force composed of significant elements of 2 or more military Services. Such a force is organized when the mission to be accomplished requires close integration of the efforts of such elements in the attainment of a specific limited objective. The classic operation of this type is the amphibious operation; another is the airborne assault. For all practical purposes, mention of these

two exhausts the list although there is still extant a viewpoint, the product of Continental thought, which was widely circulated just after WW II that in modern warfare all operations must inevitably be joint operations.

The *Beau Ideal* for the command and organization of forces for such operations is expressed in Figure 1. Among the principles associated with this diagram are these:

The Joint Task Force Commander may not command directly one of the components of the force.

He forms a joint staff or, at the very least, "augments his own staff by officers from Services other than



his own in such numbers and in appropriate positions to give equitable representation to all Services involved."

In the joint staff, officers are to be assigned "so as to insure an understanding by the commander of the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of the components of the force," and "officers from each Service should hold key positions of responsibility in the staff." Deputy chiefs of staff, in particular, "should be from the Services other than the chief of staff, in order that they may serve as senior staff advisers for their respective Service to the commander as well as providing additional balance to the joint staff."

The Joint Task Force Command-

er has "operational control" which, according to the tortured words of JAAF, "should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders, or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational control."

"Operational control" is an ambiguous term, which has meant different things to different people and has varied with the circumstances. In JAAF it is defined as comprising "those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission," but not "such Uni-Service matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training." It can scarcely be claimed that this definition sweeps away all ambiguities.

The foregoing principles give the clearest insight into the origin and nature of the *Beau Ideal*. It sets forth no real doctrine for command or for the organization of forces. Its primary focus is authority and restrictions on authority. It is a simple geometric design which nicely balances minimum aspirations of each of the military Services to command joint operations with minimum acceptable safeguards to Service interests—the latter in the form of representation on the joint staff and limitations on the scope of the Joint Task Force Commander's authority.

The trouble is that this politically ingenious device exists in a vacuum—bears little relationship to the requirements of actual operations. It was born in the Pentagon—not on the oft-times blood washed shingle of a hundred landing beaches. While there is one line of argument, to be discussed later, which favors the *Beau Ideal*, this command arrangement costs far more than it is worth.

In contrast to the *Beau Ideal*, with its geometric design and its emphasis upon command and restrictions upon command, the principles which govern the organization of forces for amphibious operations are derived from the character of the operation itself—the requirement for establishing the landing force ashore.

The inter-relation at every level of



Naval and Landing Force tasks during planning and execution requires setting up parallel Navy and Landing Force chains of command with corresponding commanders at each level. This system, with clearly outlined relationship between these parallel commanders, assures the effective discharge of coordinate Navy and Landing Force responsibilities.

The forces to conduct an amphibious operation—Landing Force as well as Naval forces for its transportation, protection and support—are assembled in an Amphibious Task Force. Some of the principles associated with this type of force are these:

The Amphibious Task Force and

Landing Force Commanders are on corresponding levels of command as regards their respective forces.

Corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of both the Naval forces and the Landing Force. Thus, within the Task Force there are 2 parallel chains of command—one for each component.

At the top of the 2 parallel chains, command is joined in the Amphibious Task Force Commander who exercises unrestricted operational command (as distinct from operational control) over the entire force as well as direct command of the Navy component.

Matters of command affecting the

Navy forces only, are exercised by the Task Force Commander through the Navy chain of command. Matters affecting the Landing Force only are discharged by the Landing Force Commander through his chain of command. Matters of command affecting both forces are transmitted via the parallel chains of command, and corresponding Navy and Landing Force commanders maintain a close and continuing relationship to insure that decisions made by one component, and which affect the other, are not placed in effect without consultation. (See Figure 2)

The doctrine for amphibious operations does not stop with these general principles. The duties of each commander are spelled out in greater detail. The Landing Force Commander is responsible for the scheme of maneuver ashore; for making recommendations on the hour of landing and the selection of landing beaches and air landing zones; for planning and requesting supporting fires and for the control and coordination of supporting fires as appropriate. Finally, he is responsible for the conduct of operations ashore.

The Amphibious Task Force Commander, for his part, coordinates the entire force in the planning phase by assigning troop missions consistent with the overall objective; by coordinating inter-staff planning; by approving the Landing Force scheme of maneuver in the light of the capacity of the Naval forces to support it; and finally, by




FIGURE 2



approving Landing Force recommendations on landing beaches, air landing zones, and hour of landing. To control the embarkation phase he assigns shipping and prescribes the embarkation schedule. During the actual landing he conducts the ship-to-shore movement, consulting with the Landing Force Commander on any change in the landing plan necessitated by unforeseen contingencies. At the same time he provides protection against enemy surface, subsurface and air attack, controls air operations, and supports the landing by naval gunfire, air operations, mining and underwater demolitions. In the integrated air defense he exercises operational control of Landing Force anti-aircraft and air warning units.

The movement ashore of the Landing Force Commander in no wise alters his relationship with the Amphibious Task Force Commander. The latter may progressively delegate to the former such functions as control of close air support or even air defense, but the Amphibious Task Force Commander continues to be responsible for the conduct of the whole operation until the landing is complete and he is relieved by higher authority.

In like manner, the specially established and limited relationships between corresponding commands at subordinate levels are spelled out.

This system of command and organization of forces has not evolved without blood, sweat and tears. For example, it was once seriously asserted that command was joined not

only at the Task Force-Landing Force level, but at subordinate levels as well. That is, the Amphibious Task Force might be divided into minor joint commands at say the Division-Amphibious Group or RLT-Transport Division level. Finally, however, it came to be recognized that the Landing Force is a highly trained and meticulously organized military body engaged in a difficult and hazardous military undertaking—that the needless interposition in the Landing Force chain of command of commanders trained in different techniques would interfere with, or suspend entirely, the exercise of planning and command functions by the Landing Force Commander and his subordinate commanders. Thus, the unsound idea of joint task forces at the several subordinate levels of command was repudiated.

The distinguishing characteristic of this type of command and organization of forces is this: the commander of one of the component forces—the one who is best situated to do so—exercises operational command over the entire force, as well as direct command over his own component, employing for this purpose his existing staff and headquarters. Coordination in planning and in execution involves only 2 (or at most 3) headquarters, each one of which is directing the operations of one of the component forces. The Force Commander through the Landing Force and Tactical Air Commanders is able to effect an intimate and instantaneous coordina-

tion of the inter-related operations of these forces that can not even be approached by a once removed coordinating headquarters.

It might be argued, of course, that command need not always be joined in the Navy Commander—that the Landing Force Commander might on occasion command the whole force. But even the most superficial analysis of the amphibious operation discloses its pre-eminently naval character. To put a Landing Force Commander in direct charge of the conduct of an amphibious operation as a whole would be to repeat the mistake of the Spanish Armada. That Armada, it will be remembered was a waterborne Army in which the commander of the troops was also the commander of the fleet. But not all landing force officers are as willing to recognize their limitations as was Don Alonzo de Guzman, who before he sailed reported to his sovereign, King Philip, "I have not one essential qualification. . . . If you send me, depend on it, I shall have a bad account to render of my trust."

From an operational viewpoint and by contrast to the command system just described, the very best one can say about the *Beau Ideal* Joint Task Force Headquarters, with its neuter commander and its hybrid staff, is that it is unnecessary.

But in military operations an unnecessary higher headquarters is not simply a waste of men and material. It is negative—a liability. It tends to destroy the initiative and responsibility of the subordinate ground,

air and naval commanders—the commanders who must plan and conduct the combat operation. Worse still, the joint headquarters does not improve the intimate coordination between operational commanders and their staffs which is so essential to a closely integrated operation of this type. On the contrary, a joint headquarters reduces coordination between the combat commands because they must look to the senior headquarters for coordination in place of themselves taking the initiative.

But this is only the beginning. The decision making process is slowed down. More time is taken in reacting to new and unexpected situations. Planning takes longer and coordination is harder. Specifically to coordinate 3 headquarters takes 200 per cent more effort than to coordinate 2. (See Figure 3)

This is particularly important in an amphibious operation where the plans do not just flow down from the higher headquarters. In this type of operation there is no place for the broad arrow technique; the requirements of the operational headquarters are the prime consideration, and these must be reflected in the overall plans. To introduce an additional and a higher headquarters is to introduce the possibility of distortion or losses in the transmission of information as it passes up and down the line, and the possibility of decisions by the higher headquarters which do not reflect accurately the requirements of those operational headquarters which have to carry the plan into effect.

It is needless, perhaps, to mention the disadvantage of diverting military personnel from genuinely productive combat tasks, particularly highly qualified officers who are always in short supply. Equally obvious are the additional communications problems associated with passing information to the commander and staff of a fifth wheel headquarters—information which in most cases serves no greater purpose than to satisfy its curiosity and give its members a sense of identification with the military operation as it progresses.

After PORTREX, it was claimed




FIGURE 3

that this exercise proved that space could be found aboard the Amphibious Task Force shipping to embark a Joint Task Force Commander and his headquarters. True, if you are willing to displace an equivalent number of fighting men and reduce the all too limited office space and communications facilities of the essential operational headquarters. Even the USO camp shows could be embarked on this basis. But how much better to embark an element that will contribute positively to the conduct of the landing.

Then there is the question of the scope of the commander's authority. In the PORTREX design the operational control exercised by the commander specifically does not extend to the so-called Uni-Service matter of administration which, of course, embraces logistics. In an amphibious operation the responsibility for the supply of the Landing Force must be the responsibility of the Amphibious Task Force Commander. There is no other way. It is patent then that the commander must have the requisite control of the logistics of the Landing Force. That the commander's authority should be commensurate with his responsibility is incontrovertible.

Does the *Beau Ideal* have any points of superiority over the command arrangements prescribed in amphibious doctrine? The best defense comes from a Landing Force spokesman. With reference again to PORTREX this officer said:

"It is believed the establishment of a Joint Task Force Invasion Commander for an amphibious operation is sound doctrine. This commander can view the operation as a whole and make decisions from an impartial viewpoint. In cases of conflict between paramount interests of various component forces, a decision from the higher command level may, in some cases become imperative. In the planning phase many conflicts in viewpoint arise which must be referred to the Commander of the Joint Task Force Invasion for decision. If the landing operation is smooth and few difficulties are encountered, he may have little to do. However, where resistance is heavy or unusual circumstances prevail, he may have to make the decision as to whether or not to risk the destruction of one force, in order to insure the success of the combined operation. Only an impartial commander in close contact with the situation can do this.

"The decision that the Commander of the Joint Task Force Invasion should accompany the expedition on one of the command ships is considered to be sound. Further, the Commander of the Joint Task Force Invasion should be free to devote full time to the problem during the planning stage, as well as during the actual operations. From the Landing Force viewpoint, the selection of an Army officer for this important assignment is desirable.

"It appears that, where an officer of any component of the service is selected as Commander of the Joint Task Force Invasion, a flag or general officer from the other two components should be placed on his staff as advisors. This would not only serve to provide the Joint Task Force Invasion Commander with advice from experienced officers of other components, but would give the subordinate component commanders of all echelons a sense of security and confidence in the decisions that are rendered."

What this boils down to is an acknowledgement that the Joint Task Force Commander and his joint staff have no real operational role, along with an assertion that they are justified as an "impartial" umpire whose presence gives the subordinate component commanders "a sense of security and confidence." Perhaps so, but it is my contention that by this organization, far more is lost in operating efficiency than is gained in increased confidence. To acknowledge, as is always done, that the Amphibious Task Force Commander alone is capable of controlling the assault landing and at the same time to insist that there must be established over him a kibitzer and an umpire to resolve any disputes which may arise between the real operational commander and his subordinates is hardly defensible.

Better to get increased confidence from a soundly based and thoroughly tested operational doctrine which spells out the duties of the corresponding commanders. Better to get it through effective presentation by component commanders of their requirements and of their recommendations for the employment of their forces. Better to get it from the mutual regard and respect which de-

velop between corresponding commanders and their respective staffs when they work together in good faith. Better, too, to assume that an Amphibious Task Force Commander, charged with complete responsibility for the conduct of a landing, can view the operation as a whole and can make decisions in that context. The evidence testifying to the validity of this assumption is impressive. Besides, should a major difference arise between the Task Force Commander and the Landing Force Commander, there is always a common superior to which it can be referred. No need to create a headquarters for that purpose—not when to do so carries with it so many disadvantages.



This illuminates another facet. A generation ago it was possible, with some logic, to support a Joint Headquarters with a joint staff for an overseas expedition. This was one way to provide the unity of command in field operations which, without special arrangements, existed nowhere short of the person of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. But the evolution in the defense organization since the jarring blow at Pearl Harbor and the equally important advances in communications and transportation have changed all this. With the establishment in each strategic area of a unified commander the need for unified commanders at subordinate levels has been altered. It was because of this that no unified headquarters was set up in Korea during the Korean War. Such a headquarters could only have duplicated the work of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command and Far East Command, and made more complex the work of his area component commanders—Army,

Navy and Air Force. How about those operations such as the amphibious landing that do require the close integration of elements of different military Services to attain a specific limited objective? Generally, as soon as the conditions requiring such close integration terminate, the temporary unity of command terminates and the forces revert to the theater pattern with component commanders controlling their respective forces in primary or in supporting roles. A temporary groupment of naval and landing forces is far better suited to this operational environment than is the over-elaborate joint headquarters which might be more justifiable if there were no unified commands.

Viewed in this light the PORT-REX swan begins to look suspiciously like a goose.

Fortunately there are in JAAF no insurmountable obstacles to organizing a Joint Task Force in the manner prescribed by amphibious doctrine. In fact it is specifically provided in JAAF that the commander of a Joint Task Force who exercises operational control over his entire force also may exercise direct command of his own Service component. But there remains in some quarters a reluctance to accept this eminently practical arrangement. More appropriate than this foot-dragging would be recognition that in many circumstances this is really the ideal pattern for the organization of Joint Task Forces and that it might profitably be used in other joint operations. Conversely, in such circumstances, the present *Beau Ideal* of the military academicians should be recognized for what it is—a political and unmilitary solution to a problem of military organization.

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INFLATION:




its impact on National Defense

By 1stLt James P. Reid

✚ ONE OF THE GREATEST HEADACHES in the government today is how to control inflation without impairing the national security. As President Eisenhower has stated, there can be "no security without solvency." But he has implied likewise that there can be no solvency without security. How do we balance the two?

Inflation is a rise in the quantity of money or credit, or both, relative

to the amount of exchange. According to the law of supply and demand, prices then rise because the seller can demand and get higher prices. The greatest drawback in an inflationary period is that savings are devalued. For example: if in 1942 a person bought a \$1,000 type E war bond, he would pay \$750. Upon cashing it in 1952, he would be given \$1,000. But in *value* those



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one thousand 1952 dollars would be worth only six hundred and fourteen 1942 dollars. In addition, he would have to pay \$50 in income tax. In theory, he accrued \$250 gain in the 10 years — in value, however, he lost \$136 and then lost fifty 1952 dollars more in income tax.

What causes inflation? When over wide segments of the economy business is concentrated in a few big

sellers, they can "administer" prices upward in spite of a sluggish demand. The huge increase in the money supply during WWII and afterwards is one reason. Another lies in the fact that there has been an excessive consumer demand, untempered by commensurate savings and accelerated by easily available consumer credit. Business demand in the "capital goods boom" spurred

prices upward. The fact that labor's wages have risen 28 per cent over its productivity in the last decade — costs which must be passed along in higher prices — adds additional momentum. But many economists charge that the greatest cause of the present inflation is the huge amount of federal spending, in spite of the government taking as much or more out of the economy in taxes as it puts in by spending.

Inflation can readily be seen in the Cost of Living Index. In an 8 February 1957 *US News and World Report* copyrighted article, Mr. George Humphrey, then Secretary of the Treasurer, explained why living costs rise:

Q. "... how does that (money spent on armament) affect the cost of living?"

A. "... It is perfectly simple. We're spending for national security about, let's call it nearly 50 billion dollars, for round figures. It isn't quite that, but it's approaching it.

"Now that includes all of our security items. We have about a 400-billion-dollar gross economy. Fifty billion dollars is about an eighth of that. That means, very roughly, that about one man in 8 is working on security, and 7 men are working on production of peacetime goods.

"Now, what's going on is that 7 men, then, are producing goods for living in America and 8 men are

getting payroll checks, so that there are 8 buyers for 7 pieces of goods, and you just can't help but have a pressure on prices. . . ."

Q. "What's the answer?"

A. "The answer is for the Government to spend less money."

The greatest spender in the Government is the Department of Defense. This fiscal year, for instance, its budget is \$38 billion out of a total federal budget of \$71 billion. And there is a conflict here. The experts in the Defense Department claim that not only can we not afford to cut any money out of the Defense budget but that we need more! Viewing the recent launching of a Soviet ICBM, the Communists' huge standing army, their rapidly growing fleet including over 600 submarines, and the Sputnik, these experts state that to counter them we will need all we've got and more. But more military spending means more inflation. And more inflation means that the military will have to pay more, which means that they will need more to spend, which means that there will be more inflation, etc. How can we have effective security and yet halt this spiraling inflation?

I can think of two answers. Inflation in a time of peril such as this can only mean that the people are unaware of their danger or are turning their backs to it. If the former, it is part of our job to ensure that they are enlightened. We must not forget, as Gen Mark Clark rephrased Clausewitz, that to the Communists "politics is nothing else than a continuation of war by other means." Krushchev's recent boast that "We will bury you," represents a most determined threat to our entire way of life. If the latter (which, let us hope, it is not), we will have to reconsider our moral values. It is in our immediate and most narrow self-interest to realize that our material and social well-being is greatly dependent on the outlay for national security. Once this is grasped, we can then deal effectively with the inflationary problem. For in a period of dire external danger, rising inflation can only mean that our values are distorted—that we are more pre-occupied with the internal economic aspects of our national well-being than with the less tangible but equally important values of the military safeguards.

When this is thoroughly understood, defense spending will cease to be a major cause of inflation.

The second solution for attaining effective security in an inflationary period is to get the most out of the money that we have. To oversimplify it, we must get "more bang for a buck." When trying to pare down costs it is useful to look at our costliest weapons systems to see if there is any surplus fat.

Among the most costly are the aerial delivery systems of thermonuclear weapons. With our development of the thermonuclear bomb we had achieved a capability for deterring all-out aggression and perhaps limited aggression as well. But the Russians now possess both the bombs and the delivery capability. And, as we have come to see, these weapons have become so effective that, ironically enough, they are too dangerous to use. Thomas E. Murray, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, expressed it: "Man now has the power to put an end to his own history." We are beginning to realize that our retaliatory force is good only as a deterrent to surprise thermonuclear attack on our vital interests. It is effective here but ineffective elsewhere. It is not a good weapon of war—only a good weapon to *deter* war. Because of its inconceivably destructive qualities it should be used only when it is no longer otherwise possible to prevent an all-out war.

But this raises the question, "How much of a deterrent is needed to deter?" Over a year ago, when the Russians were blackmailing England and France, after their intervention in Suez, with threats of rocket attacks, Gen Alfred Gruenther of NATO stated: "If these rockets, however, should be used, bear this in mind: they will not destroy our

capacity to retaliate, and just as sure as day follows night, that retaliation would take place. And as of now the Soviet Union would be destroyed."

The point to be noted here, I think, is the use of the word "destroyed." The General did not say "beaten" or "forced to capitulate." Many thinkers have questioned the fact whether we must be able to "destroy" Russia to deter her. Would the Communists be deterred if they would only be half destroyed—one third—how much? Our scarecrow may be too big—a smaller one might keep the birds out just as well. Much more thought must be given to this question. If the deterrent force, which is now unbelievably costly and growing costlier, is too large, we may be able to put the excess money into weapons that are suitable for waging less destructive war. The deterrent area, then, is one in which we may be able to economize.

Other economy areas may be seen in some of the various Defense Establishment reorganization proposals. Most of these proposals are the children of the present budgetary squeeze on the Defense Department. They propose reorganization as the cure to these budget problems. In a new book entitled, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, our defense problems are analyzed in microscopic detail. There is produced a vast array of evidence why the Communists would prefer "limited" to "all-out" war—that their doctrine stresses a strategy of ambiguity and an oblique rather than a head-on approach. We clearly see how our thermonuclear sledgehammer is not a good flyswatter; but while the argument is convincing for the necessity of our developing a capability and doctrine for limited war, the concrete suggestions are not so over-



Lt Reid was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1955 after graduation from Harvard Law School. He attended Basic School at Quantico and was CO, K Company, 1st ITR, Camp Lejeune, N. C. Returning to Quantico in 1957, he assumed duties as Staff Assistant for Doctrine and Development, MCS. He is presently serving as Secretary, Marine Corps Board, Quantico, Va.

whelming.

In part, the proposals are based on the alleged duplication and costly overlapping of weapons systems. The need for mobility in getting combat forces into the battle area quickly is stressed and the deficiencies of the Navy's sea transport are cited. In its stead there is recommended that we develop a force of some 200 to 300 C-133s or their equivalent, to enable us to fly an Army combat division within 10 to 15 days to the threatened area. But it is realized that airlift must rely on our ability to use bases close to the combat zone; that for now we should be able to count on Okinawa or perhaps the Philippines as a staging area for the Far East, or Cyprus or Libya for the Middle East, and Great Britain for Europe.

But from this ointment there sounds a buzzing. And this fly is no flea; rather a veritable pterodactyl. Even the most cursory look at a map shows this scheme to be illusionary. From the "staging areas" cited above we would still have to get over water or land to the combat zone. The troops would have to be loaded on the Navy's ships at Cyprus, Libya, etc. But could we fly them direct to the combat zone? Neither the C-130 nor C-133 is a magic carpet. They are huge lumbering creatures demanding, at the very least, rough landing fields. Who's going to prepare these fields—the enemy? In attempting to fly into the combat zone, even against the lightest resistance, these monstrous birds could be riddled by small arms fire. Therefore, we might get the troops into Cyprus, etc., within 15 days, but it would probably take them 15 more to get off the island and into the fight. This fleet of cargo carriers would cost approximately between \$1.9 and \$2.6 billion for procurement. This is in addition to the present cost of the Navy's ships which would be needed anyway! Instead of eliminating alleged duplication such a scheme is duplication personified.

But there is another flaw in this proposal for an air lifted "Tactical Force." A landing operation on foreign territory is a tumultuous thing. It cannot be mastered easily and would involve further great cost in training new units. Marines, on the other hand, have long experience in

landing on a hostile shore, fighting violent actions initially with a minimum of supplies, in the greatest confusion. The nature of this action is the "assault" wherein the violence, hardship and confusion are countered by discipline and long experience in team work. In the past we have planned where and when we would land; in the future the enemy may make this decision for us. Marines will be thrown into battle fast to stem the tide until reinforcements arrive. This is in keeping with the Marine Corps' roll as a "Force-in-Readiness." The Marine Corps is not designed to win a war by itself but, by being ready for the opening gun, it complements the Army forces which are needed to "win" the war. The Army, therefore, must take more time to size up the situation properly. If air lift for Army forces is required, Naval Construction Battalions (SeaBees) could prepare the necessary landing fields. The proposal is that such an air fleet can *supplant* the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team. That it can not do. It might supplement it in later stages of the battle, if needed. Both capabilities would complement each other.

Others have been trying to solve the limited war problem within our budgetary limitations. The US Tactical Air Command has created a Composite Air Striking Force (CASF) which has been advertised as the "Air Force Answer to Limited War." This force is a miniaturized version of a tactical air force for hasty deployment to any part of the world. Many of its proponents believe that the CASF may be used alone in a "purely air effort." Used in combined operations, air efforts have been notably successful. In fact, some of the drawbacks to air operations in Korea in the later stages of the war were attributed to the fact that there was not enough ground pressure placed on the Communist Army. Our ground effort was not forcing them to expend enough. Even with their limited transportation means, the Communists could supply themselves at night when our air interdiction was less effective. If our pressure forced them to use daytime transportation the air forces would have been far more effective. In a "purely air effort" then air operations lose their effectiveness. The

Air Force made some claims during its "Operation STRANGLE" in the Korean War that air interdiction alone could prove "decisive." The British tried this theory in the recent revolts in Oman but eventually had to bring in ground troops to quell the rebellion. Neither air operation was successful per se and there is cause to wonder if, even armed with nuclear weapons, one could be successful now.

The answer to atomic blast is dispersal. The limiting factor is how far you can disperse. Someone once said that if there were no NATO ground troops in Europe the Russians could separate their men one mile apart and march to the Atlantic. Any nuclear weapon, no matter what the yield, would then be only a noise in the wilderness. To complement the use of nuclear weapons, ground troops are required to block the enemy, to force him to concentrate into a lucrative target. The same applies to limited war. The enemy's first play will probably be to flood the area with ground troops and dash to the friendly cities, knowing that there we will not atomically blast him and the innocent populace alike.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote on this subject recently, stating that in the future it may be possible to defend countries by mobile nuclear weapons. He especially cited the use of nuclear artillery for dominating invasion routes which may be limited by terrain.

Artillery, like aircraft, must be complemented by ground troops. For to herd the sheep together for shearing with the nuclear scissors you need a shepherd. Marines can fulfill this role perfectly. The ground component of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force can be thrown against the aggressor immediately, forcing him to mass. And when he does the Marine Air Component can shear him. If we are to continue our policy of "Containment" such projectionable air-ground forces are hardly "obsolete" or "non-essential" as some critics have charged. To contain, we need something that is more than a sieve. Nuclear weapons employment alone leaves too many gaps for the enemy to sift through. When the Red Bear comes out of his wilderness seeking honey he knows there are hunters. He will travel in

disguise at night and will stick to the heavy woods. One of the hunters has to flush him into the open so that another can nail him. Each depends on the other. Together they can drive the Bear back to his wasteland—separately they will find that he may gobble up both the honey and them too.

But, in addition to their wartime capabilities, Marines in a balanced fleet perform another task. In contrast to the proposed "Tactical Force" which would be garrisoned in the continental US, the balanced fleet enables us to "wage peace" abroad, as President Eisenhower termed it. Mr. Dulles has phrased it that their efforts contribute to "dynamic peace." This is most important in this era of budgetary scarcity. From one expenditure we get diplomats as well as soldiers.

Our war with the Communists so far has been largely in the foreign policy field. And, to quote Winston Churchill, "No foreign policy can have any validity if there is not adequate force behind it." We are engaged now in a modern version of "gunboat diplomacy." But this phrase is historically somewhat offensive. Today we call it "showing the flag." For example, in the Jordanian crisis of April '57 the newly enunciated "Eisenhower Doctrine" was put to the test. Under this doctrine Congress had approved the use of force, if necessary, to stymie Communist aggression in the Middle East. Putting teeth in this doctrine, the balanced 6th Fleet with carrier striking forces and a reinforced Battalion of Marines, steamed eastward through the Mediterranean. (Coincidentally, at that time another force of Marines was heading from the US to "replace" them, and it is rather difficult to distinguish between "replacements" and "reinforcements.")

The US warned Syria, Egypt and Israel to keep their fingers out of King Hussein's troubles. The King did not ask for help, which the doctrine required to be invoked, but it was obvious to all that the help was readily available. The balanced fleet here was a cop on the beat. The capability of the Marines to land was a type of power the lesser nations can understand and respect. They can thumb their noses at our thermonuclear forces, understanding

the US psychology well enough that we would not bully them with such monstrous power. As the French found to their sorrow in Indo-China and Algeria the use of ground troops is necessary sometimes whether we like it or not. Let us avoid such involvement where it is unnecessary, but let us be prepared psychologically if we must.

Another credit accrues to the balanced fleet in that it keeps our flag flying forward. Historically, America has been prone to isolationism and the other nations know it. The presence of the fleet is tangible evidence that we are not backing away from our world-wide responsibilities. It also demonstrates our determination to adhere to our manifold treaty and mutual security obligations. The gray diplomats of the fleet may be out of sight but not out of mind. And being in international waters they do not transgress on the sovereignty of other nations. In a period of rampant nationalism and anti-colonialism this is of cardinal value. We cannot assume that the Afro-Asian peoples look upon Americans as the incarnation of Beauty and Justice. The world-wide publicity given to the Little Rock incident has assured this. Marines on board ship at least do not aggravate this condition. We are then getting double our money's worth out of a balanced fleet which could not be said of a "Tactical Force" stationed back in the United States.

In seeking to save money by eliminating duplication, some of the reorganizationists would create a "Tactical Command" for dealing with the small wars, backed up by the Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force as mere training and administrative commands. But could this save anything? We would have to shell out vast sums to create an esprit de corps in this "Tactical Force." For man has not become a machine yet, regardless of the implications in some of these mechanical organization schemes. History, tradition and pride still play a predominant role in the efficiency of any organization. And what stirring traditions would a "Tactical Force" have?

At least one of the reorganizationists has evolved the theory that future land actions in limited warfare should more approximate naval

strategy than historical land combat operations. Such strategy would include self-contained units which would not establish a front line or physically occupy territory but, self-contained and with great fire power, would destroy the enemy's forces. This is well-reasoned. But from this it is then proposed that the Navy be generally relegated to an anti-submarine role and that the Army take over the "Tactical Force" which would fight these naval style ground actions. In an age of budgetary scarcity, such duplication must be ruled out. Why spend scarce money to teach soldiers what sailors already know?

In an inflationary economic period such as the present, the defense establishment must spend no more than necessary. It must get the most out of what it has, before asking for more. Its forces must be flexible so they can serve more than one purpose. The balanced fleet provides this requirement by "showing the flag" in the far corners of the world; by "waging peace" along with showing its combat powers. A Tactical Force or the Composite Air Strike Force or the Strategic Air Command, all generally stationed in the continental US do not fulfill this requirement of flexibility as well. Before asking for fleets of monstrous air cargo planes, we must be sure that they have the capability to provide real mobility. Their seemingly great speed is through the air only and may require the same surface logistic facilities as if they did not exist.

We must also take a lesson from the "balanced fleet" concept. Here each arm complements the other. One of our main troubles with military costs has been that often we have been too prone to seek the "pure" theory—that one weapon provides all the answers. Instead of complementing the capabilities of another weapon, it is designed to incorporate all values into itself. Consequently, some of our most costly weapons systems, especially in our retaliatory forces, have been duplicatory of our more graduated forces. A mechanical approach to organization or to weaponry will eventually only prove wasteful.

We cannot afford to spend before we think. If money for defense is spent wisely it need not be a cause of inflation.

US MC

French Helicopter Operations in Algeria




Is the impact of French helicopter experience in

Algeria such that we need revise or modify our own tactics?

By Maj David Riley

THE FAMILIARITY WITH WHICH school children now banter sonic speed terminology about and the almost casual acceptance of awesome nuclear tests would almost seem to herald the "dating" of other less impressive contributions to the science of war, such as the helicopter.

Since the commissioning of the first helicopter squadron (1947) into the Marine Corps' evolving family of aircraft, we have continually examined and evaluated the means by which we can most effectively apply its versatility in combat. Our helicopter experiences in Korea consisted of observation, liaison, reconnaissance, evacuation missions and troop lifts between landing zones that were rarely subjected to enemy fire. Subsequently, our primary research efforts have been directed towards the "big lift" (the helicopter assault in the ship-to-shore movement) to the almost complete exclusion of its use in smaller increments in a limited or pre-nuclear war. A



limited war is now in progress in Algeria. The French use of helicopters there represents their first application as a troop assault vehicle, in small increments, working in conjunction with other air and ground units under combat conditions.

Is the impact of French helicopter experience in Algeria such that we need revise or modify our own tactics?

Before answering this question it is necessary to examine certain factors peculiar to this conflict, excluding the political ramifications and their relationship to the use of the helicopter. It is first of all not a true "war" but is more accurately


land. Here the pattern of guerrilla warfare remains unchanged since the beginning of time — hit and hide, raid and run.

The deployment of French forces, generally based upon population density and rebel activity, is complicated by border surveillance requirements (mandatory if rebel supply lines are to be strangled) and general security requirements throughout the country. Military efforts are further hampered by the limitations of French economy and NATO commitments which preclude the possibility of further augmentation of their Algerian forces at this time.

All military units are assigned to

P-47 — These vintage aircraft are in short supply and plagued by maintenance difficulties. Almost 100 per cent of the losses have been operational, as opposed to combat. (The capabilities of the AD are readily recognized but military economics prohibit their incorporation into the fighter forces at this time. F4Us are a desired second choice, but as part of the naval forces, they do not participate in the land campaign).

B-26 — A twin engine light bomber used primarily for bombing, border surveillance and reconnaissance missions; a few have been configured for photo work.



defined as a "guerrilla war." There are no lines, fixed or flexible, which contain or define rebel activity. He strikes anytime, anyplace, at his own choosing.

However, the struggle is not felt throughout the entire country for only the northern tenth of it supports rebel activity; remunerative targets are non-existent in the southern wastes of the Sahara. Rebel activity flourishes in the large coastal cities of Oran, Algiers and Constantine, which necessitates the assignment of large numbers of troops to combat these urban terroristic efforts. But major French efforts and all tactical aircraft are directed towards enemy forces in the hinter-

land. Here the pattern of guerrilla warfare remains unchanged since the beginning of time — hit and hide, raid and run.

In order to render the most effective air support to the widely dispersed ground units, each corps area is supported by an Air Force Tactical Air Group. These groups are comprised of the following types of aircraft:

MISTRAL — A highly maneuverable single engine jet fighter of French design. However, its excessive fuel consumption at low altitudes, and its prohibitive speed in strafing runs against a small, well camouflaged target, make it of doubtful value.

SNJ — This WWII trainer was used in the early stages of the war as a primary support plane. Preferably identified by the French as a search and reconnaissance aircraft, it is nevertheless armed with 2 or 4 thirty caliber machine guns, rockets and/or bombs. Although still used in early support efforts, this function has become a secondary mission because of the enemy's increased AA capability. Highly effective in this type warfare, a squadron has been assigned to each zone commander under the operational command of a tactical air officer serving on the staff of the zone commander.

HELICOPTERS

BELL — Used primarily for medical evacuation and liaison.

ALOUETTE — A French turbine powered helicopter of about the same size as the Bell but with greater lift capability and power; also used for evacuation and liaison.

HRS — Initially used as a troop carrier and now used for logistic missions such as medical evacuation.

WESTLAND — British manufactured version of the HRS.

HUS — Primary troop assault helicopter (Air Force).

H-21 — Primary troop assault helicopter (Army).

French Army aviation consists of light aircraft platoons (VMO), one to a zone, and one helicopter group (Army Group Helicopter #2 based at Setif in the Constantine area). Its helicopters are the same as those of Air Force Groups except that the H-21 is its primary troop assault helicopter. However, this group may in the near future be reorganized so as to provide for the inclusion of representative numbers of all type helicopters into one squadron. Theoretically it is envisaged that such a squadron will then be capable of independent operation on detached duty in support of group operations for several days.

The light helicopter squadrons of both services have been assigned, in units of one or two, to the widely dispersed garrisons and placed under their operational control. Utilized for evacuation purposes, and secondarily as liaison and command utility vehicles, such decentralization is essential to provide for the expeditious evacuation of the wounded to base hospitals.

Inasmuch as there is little basis upon which to differentiate between the tactical use of helicopters by either the Army or Air Force, the specific identification of one service is not intended to reflect adversely



upon the other.

The sources of information upon which a military operation is staged identify it as a "pre-planned" or "contact" engagement. The "contact" engagement, as the name implies, is usually the result of patrol activity, aerial or ground. The use of helicopters in this type operation more often meets the requirement of expediency vice terrain consideration; as is the case in the pre-planned operation. In this latter type operation, normally inaccessible terrain will be occupied by helicopter-borne forces for one or more of several reasons. The terrain may serve as an observation point for artillery spotting; a communications relay point; an advanced CP, or as is more likely, a point from which to effect a link-up with truck-borne forces on the low ground. A shoulder-to-shoulder sweep of the area will then be initiated.

In observing a representative type pre-planned operation, a pattern was revealed that, with few exceptions, was common to other pre-planned missions. A regiment in the

Constantine area was ordered to sweep an area suspected of containing a band of 80 rebels. Because of terrain considerations, it was determined that helicopter participation would be necessary. On D-2, planning for the operation was initiated and the helicopter annex of the operations order was based on the technical advice of the helicopter unit.

On the afternoon of D-1, the 8 helicopter pilots assigned to the mission gathered for a briefing, together with a representative of the SNJ squadron that was to furnish initial air support. Maps were issued, studied and marked, together with aerial photographs of the landing site. The briefing, although informal, was precise.

The troops arrived by truck at the air base shortly before dawn on D-day and upon disembarking were immediately formed into 4 heli-teams of 8 men each. Colored strips of cloth worn through their shoulder straps contrasted oddly against the khaki green uniform. This type of identification, modified on succeeding operations, served to distinguish between friendly forces and rebel bands wearing captured uniforms. Although mutual training was not observed between ground and helicopter units, embarkation in the warmed-up H-21s was smooth and expeditious. The troops made no effort to fasten their safety belts, which obviously would have been difficult, if not impossible, in view of the hundreds of rounds of ammo and hand grenades festooned to



Maj Riley was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1943 and received his flight training through the Aviation Cadet Program at Corpus Christi, Texas. After serving with VMF 216 during WWII, he returned to Pensacola, Florida as an instructor in the Training Command. He served with VMF 323 in Korea and soon thereafter assumed duties as CO of HMR 161, MABS 13, 1st MarBrig. His present assignment is: Helicopter Operations Officer, Air Section, T&T, MCLFDC, Quantico, Virginia.

their straps. None of the heli-teams possessed any special qualifications. Automatic weapons were distributed equally among the heli-teams and although portable communications equipment was carried in the lead helicopter, neither the composition, equipment nor mission of any heli-team differed from that of any other.

Airborne at H-35, the helicopters were preceded to the objective area at H-15 by an observation aircraft. His mission was to observe and report on conditions in the landing zone that could adversely affect the helicopter assault. Specifically, he was to report enemy absence or presence in the zone, and whether or not he was receiving fire. At H-15, 2 SNJs orbiting out of sight were called in for strafing runs by the observation pilot and at H-1 he marked the landing zone with smoke.

Control of the strafing aircraft was now assigned to the pilot of the lead helicopter. With wind direction and velocity clearly indicated, he turned into his approach. The SNJs pulled up and orbited—ready to resume strafing at a moment's notice.


Thirty-two troops disembarked on the hilltop in a matter of minutes. In the valleys below were lines of troops, some stationery, others cautiously advancing. Behind them were the parked trucks that had brought them up the winding roads in the early morning hours. Overhead, the H-21s whirled away to a secondary pick-up zone where a truck-borne platoon of 48 stood waiting. This second lift required all 4 helicopters for the first run and a second trip by 2 of the 4. Upon completion of this lift to the landing zone, the helicopters, utilizing a shuttle racetrack pattern, immediately initiated a third lift of a rifle company to the landing zone. All possible avenues of escape in the objective area were now occupied or exposed to covering fire by the helicopter-borne troops commanding the ridge lines. Some 12 minutes flying time away from the objective area, was a clearing to which the helicopters departed to await possible on-call missions.

The early morning silence was now broken only by the low flying SNJs. Easily visible, apprehensive and incongruous, was a sheep herder with his flock, a peasant from the

village at the foot of the mountain—the sole and innocent inhabitant of the entire objective area.

This unsuccessful operation is by no means uncommon. More rewarding, are the results of the "contact" engagement. The helicopters are "scrambled" and proceed at maximum power to the garrison nearest the scene of action for a troop pick-up. In the event that such contacts are with relatively large rebel bands, support aircraft and additional truck and helicopter-borne troops will be immediately dispatched to the area. The operation will then take the form of the pre-planned operation.

The full potential of the helicopter in both types of engagements has only recently been fully realized. Helicopter tactics, including the use of fixed wing aircraft for fire support, are now in the latter stages of evolution. Initially, contact with the enemy could not be fully exploited and French tacticians realized that only large troop carrying helicopters



could fulfill the requirement for the expeditious movement of large numbers of troops. Efforts were directed towards the procurement of such machines and in the summer of 1956, Sikorsky HUSs and Vertol H-21s made an initial appearance in the Air Force and Army respectively. Some factors influencing the Air Force's preference were the greater power and speed of the HUS. The Army favored the H-21's potentially greater troop capacity, its 2 access doors and the high terrain clearance by virtue of its tandem rotors.

A decisive factor in any military effort may resolve itself in terms of economies of equipment and it is therefore of interest to note that the

helicopter pilots of both services, despite the use of different primary aircraft, have established enviable records of safety. The low accident rates are attributable to the excellent basic training received in France—Air Force helicopter trainees receive approximately 160 hours of flight time during their 6-month training course. All but the most advanced students progress from light to heavier types by a balanced recognition of proficiency and time-in-type. Relatively few hours, approximately 12, are dedicated to mountain training, but upon arrival

in Algeria an apprenticeship as co-pilot must be served for many hundreds of hours before the student is qualified as a first pilot. The low accident rates have justifiably warranted the use of superlatives in describing French helicopter pilots. Such accolades are, however, equally applicable to any pilot with recent extensive time in type.

The helicopter's tactical evolution began with its use in increments of one or two which landed troops directly upon the enemy. The rebels' inexperience in dealing with this new type aircraft and his early lack of weapons, allowed such tactics to succeed. However, helicopter losses were, and are, relatively light in

comparison to the number of combat hours flown and a realistic evaluation of actual helicopter vulnerability cannot be made on the basis of these losses. Excluding even those missions on which they are not subjected to fire, enemy efforts in terms of downed aircraft are unimpressive.

Surrounded rebel bands are in the first stage of defeat. Subject to strafing and/or artillery fire, untrained in the intricacies of deflection shooting, and most often armed with a weapon best suited for clubbing, the effect of their fire was negligible. However, as they gained in experi-

ence and their arsenal grew, the helicopters began to suffer a proportionate increase in the number of hits received.

The resultant losses in men and equipment necessitated a re-examination of the tactics. Steps to reduce vulnerability consisted of the installation of self-sealing gas tanks on all H-21s with similar installations forthcoming on the HUS. Armor plating is experimentally being installed about certain engine components and around the pilots' compartments; the pilots have long been wearing flak vests and the use of a

second vest in the seat is not uncommon.

A new tactical concept provided for increased strafing efforts in the landing zone, maximum troop debarkation when the terrain permitted, and greater emphasis being given to the selection of alternate landing zones whenever prohibitive enemy fire was received in the primary landing zone. This re-examination, and the application of its results, has shown a significant decrease in the number of hits suffered. Air Force helicopter units are continually experimenting with new



methods and equipment directed toward further reducing present helicopter losses which is in some cases coincident with support requirements for ground units.

Large pre-planned operations may now provide for the establishment of a separate task organization. Its commander, with his 2 principal subordinates, the helicopter unit commander and the helicopter-borne troop commander, is charged with the responsibility for the planning and execution of the lift. Upon completion of the helicopter phase of the operation, the task organization will be dissolved and participating units will revert to their parent commands. Applicable to both the Army and Air Force, the similarity between this and our own HAF is readily apparent.

Here, however, the similarity ends. The absence of supporting fires to and from the objective area serves to obviate the necessity for establishing approach and retirement lanes. The absence of enemy aircraft and AA fire eliminates the need for escort aircraft, outside of the immediate landing zone. The relatively short hauls, excellent photographic coverage and the pilots' intimate knowledge of the terrain, make equally unnecessary the use of pathfinder aircraft and portable homers. The majority of operations — 4 to 6 helicopters utilizing one or

2 landing sites — lack the complexity that would ordinarily necessitate the use of a family of landing tables. And there is logically no provision for the use of helicopter support units/teams. Air control agencies exist only at the various base headquarters and control personnel (TACP and TAC(A) non-organic to ground units) participate in but few operations.

Requests for air support may originate from the smallest tactical unit in the field either directly to its headquarters or via an airborne observer. Upon receipt of such requests at division headquarters, the tactical air officer in the zone will normally dispatch his light support aircraft (SNJ) to the scene and, depending on the magnitude of the operation, await amplifying reports from these aircraft, or simultaneously initiate a request to the tactical air group serving that corps for other heavier support aircraft, and/or helicopters, as required. Flexibility and expediency is readily provided for by virtue of a 24-hour watch on VHF nets common to all headquarters.

The conclusions reached on the basis of these observations, some debatable, others acceptable per se, are nevertheless worthy of note.

1. Complete control of the air enroute to, and in, the area of the landing zone is mandatory.

2. Intense suppressive fire, air and naval gunfire, must blanket the immediate area of the landing zone.

3. Light armor plating about engine accessories and the pilot's compartment is desirable.

4. In the area of the landing zone, trained AA personnel, in camouflaged bunkers, with modern equipment, and *forewarned*, can raise hell with a helicopter force.

5. The use of the helicopter as a VTOL aircraft in this type terrain is mandatory for the realization of maximum tactical efficiency; STOL aircraft cannot either replace or supplement it.

6. Helicopter units should not be comprised primarily of pilots limited or restricted to helicopter aircraft. Diversified pilot experience, particularly in support/interceptor aircraft, is desirable in order to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the overall effort. Familiarity breeds efficiency.

7. Mutual training between helicopter and ground units is necessary. Only by this means does the number one user best learn of its capabilities and limitations.

8. Our helicopter tactics are sound and need no major revision or modification; however, one of the most important ingredients of any doctrine is the provision for flexibility. Tactics, like men, must be continually examined and evaluated.

US 3 MC



"Port Arms"

☛ IT WAS AT PEARL HARBOR shortly before WWII, and the young sea-going Marine was standing the brow watch. It was a chill rainy after-midnight watch and only the ships officers were passing aboard, liberty for the crew having long since expired.

Tired of holding the rifle and hoisting it to "Present Arms" each time an officer appeared, the ingenious young Leatherneck eyed the fixed bayonet on his rifle and the heavy beam in the small sentry box roof. He came to "Present Arms" and then drove the point into the overhead, suspending his rifle in front of him. As officers approached, he merely removed his hands from his pockets and grasped the rifle and the officers returned his salute.

This worked wonderfully well until the Ship's Navigator strolled in from shore leave; he paused to chat with the sentry, and the hapless youngster tugging lightly on the rifle discovered that the deeply imbedded point would not come out of the wood. There he stood, as the Navigator talked, at a rigid "Present Arms." Finally as the Naval Officer turned to leave he said, "Say, sentry, don't you ever come to Port Arms?"

SSgt R. R. Sims

Hurry


☛ A MARINE ON LEAVE came rushing in to my Recruiting Office saying he was getting a dirty deal. He had only been home for three days, and now he was being ordered back to his base. He gave me the letter which contained a check and a transmittal of records which stated, "sign and return to Base immediately."

TSgt W. J. Greskevitch

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)

***a step
beyond
push-button
warfare!***

TALOS



This Talos launching from the RCA Defense System on Dec. 13, 1957, resulted in direct hit on distant drone plane.

The RCA Talos Defense System is the first *completely automatic* land-based system for launching and guiding missiles, and utilizes the Talos Missile developed by the Applied Physics Laboratory and produced by Bendix. The Defense Unit receives target signals from remote outposts, analyzes them with regard to number of attackers, location, course and speed. Next, computers determine the logical points of interception, order the missiles loaded on launchers, guide them at supersonic speed to the vicinity of the target, after

which the missiles "lock" on the target and close in for its destruction. All without even the touch of a button! The RCA Talos Defense System, with its electronic equipment and guidance systems, was designed, developed and built by RCA as prime contractor, aided by many subcontractors. It was turned over to the U. S. Army on October 15, 1957, and is a missile milestone, exemplifying the continuing determination of American enterprise to secure peace with honor and justice.



Tmk(s) ®

RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS

CAMDEN, N. J.



ON A BRIGHT CHILL SAN DIEGO morning in January of 1942, a brand-new platoon of recruits, among them this writer, stood their first colors as US Marines. Stiff and self-consciously awkward in our new utilities and fibre sun-hats, we stared straight ahead (well, almost straight ahead) as the flag snapped smartly on the pole which rose high above the gleaming brass of the sea-school's five-inch naval gun at the head of the parade ground. The band slammed into "Semper Fidelis" and as it wheeled and marched past, I'm sure not a one of us regretted where he stood that morning.

Few of us were over 19 years old. We were all volunteers (a fact which our DI grimly reminded us of many times in the days following) and in spite of our bewilderment and unvoiced homesickness, we all knew perfectly well why we had joined the Corps. It was simply that they were the best and that was all there was to it. No one had attempted to influence us by saying that the Corps was the easiest service in that it had the greatest variety of tasks.

By Capt T. K. Thomas, USMCR

Privates For General Service

cal schools, or that it afforded the most pleasant liberty runs. We expected nothing — except that if we made it, we could call ourselves Marines. And that was enough.


A critic would be quick to point out that this reminiscence of mine represents the feelings of the last "naive" generation. I would be the first to agree, yet I am also certain that any psychologist would hold that our feelings about "general service" in the Marine Corps in 1942, being genuine and quite normal, were at least as valid as those of an Air Force enlistee, for example, who joins the service today for the express purpose of getting a heap of free electronics training to prepare him for a job in industry. In both cases, there are the same opportunities for either disillusionment or affirmation. The Air Force enlistee, however, may discover that what he really wants isn't electronics training at all but simply the chance to become a successful member of the Air Force.

The Marine Corps that our platoon entered in 1942 was simple in

structure compared to that of today. Duty was either sea-going, guard company, or the quick-swelling ranks of the FMF. There was Aviation, too, for what the attitude of the time held to be the brighter lads who could pass the aviation tests. Then there were the Raiders, regarded as the epitome of soldiering. Some of these branches were for volunteers but nobody was too disappointed if he didn't make his choice. You had to be tall, straight and a good drill-man for sea school. For the Raiders you had to be extra tough. For Aviation you had to have "aptitude." For the FMF you just kept your mouth shut. For guard company you just had to be unlucky. After all, you were all Marines and you could all shoot an '03 and roll a heavy marching order. If you had the ability to learn air gunnery or how to operate SCR radio gear, why that was all to the good. In addition, if you had any illusions about your primary job, which was preparation for combat, the bayonet course straightened you out in a hurry. You were all "general serv-

ice" and boot camp was the starting point. This singleness of method was one of the main factors responsible for the cohesiveness of the Corps and for the strength of its esprit.

This same factor is at work in the Corps today and its value is immeasurable, provided that it is not diluted by one or more of the insidious solvents of this public relations age. Among these are the temptation to recruit by "luxury benefits" and "choice of duty." The latter is a dangerous presumption that youth knows exactly what it wants in the way of military jobs. Satisfying the youth's desire to serve in tanks, for instance, is expected to make him happy and a better soldier. This is a false doctrine. It serves only to fill recruiting quotas and it raises far more problems than it solves. It should never become the Corps' method. The poster with its simple message, "This Rifle Needs a Man!" may not jam the recruiting stations, but in the end it will produce the type of attitude the Corps is really looking for in the men it needs.



CO-WINNER GROUP II



Who will manage their career, men or machines?

Once these men master the fundamentals of their basic training, they can go ahead to such other technical training as their abilities and desires indicate. Not every one will end up with the duty he most desires, but the so-called "exigencies" of the service would be so exercised that only a minority at any given time would exist in this category. This should be a positive policy from command level downward. The Marine Corps has not always practiced this, and for very good reasons.

The biggest reason is what I take to be the great occupational disease of military organizations (indeed, all large organizations of men and women). I call it "administrative expediency." Its socially accepted name is "management efficiency" and it is one of those afflictions like the "Rat Fever" of the Korean campaign. Its course can be predicted and charted and its effects understood, but there is no known cure for it.

Consider this incident. In 1943, at the great sprawling Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, N. C., the 3d MAW was being organized.

I was Radio Chief of a fighter squadron at the time and we needed radiomen. The MAG Sergeant Major called one morning and told me to come down to headquarters, in company with other NCOs and pick out some radiomen.

The MAG had received a miscellaneous draft of men, some fresh from Parris Island and others transferred from the line. The closest I could come to radiomen was a scattering of field telephone men. This was before the advent of the MOS system so I had no such convenience to fall back on. I had to conduct an impromptu interview with each man, determine his electrical background from his answers to questions; also, and this was important, determine his desire to do the job.

When we had the men we needed, we marched them back to our respective squadrons and proceeded to teach them the operation and maintenance of radio gear which was also brand-new to us. And, if I may say so, we did a pretty good job, both in our choice and in our instruction.

Consider how the same problem

would be solved in the Corps of say, 1953. If a squadron needed radiomen, the MAG would consult MRI, which would produce a neat listing of names under the requisite MOS. These names would be sifted through the necessary channels and presently the radiomen would appear, ostensibly qualified to do the work. This method is far easier than the method of 1943 but in the process something of extreme value is lost. This is the value of individual contact, of heart-to-heart dealing among men with common interest.

The MOS system is a perfect example of "administrative expediency." It says in effect, "Here is a list of men under the MOS that you need. You don't have to go through all the bother of hunting them, talking to them, trying to size them up. They've already been sized up and classified. Besides, it's not your job to do that."

I don't agree. The MOS system neatly absolves leaders of a valuable responsibility, namely, that of judging another's capabilities, of making a decision about it, of seeing how it works out. When mistakes are made, something of value is learned and maturity and wisdom is increased. It can be said that such mistakes lead to combat losses. This is possible, but battles are fought with the heart not with the head, and the "misfit" can fight with as great an inspiration as the "perfect choice." The MOS classification system is a product of the administrative mind, not the fighting mind. The Marine Corps should never consider itself so large, or so busy, or so modern, that it cannot take time to talk to one man about his job as a Marine. When it does, it then becomes nothing more than a military machine, and not a very flexible one at that.

It is customary to consider the present-day Marine Corps, engaged in its tasks of preparing for atomic warfare, as a very complex and intricate organization compared to the Corps of 1942. Administratively, this is true. "Management efficiency" has had several years in which to work. However, with respect to the Marine himself, the Corps has changed remarkably little. The material the Corps has to work with—in the same sense that a football

Capt Thomas enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1942 and was commissioned in 1944. During WWII he served with: MAG 44, VMF 212. In the Korean War he served with MAG 26 and the 1st MAW. He has attended the University of California, Kenyon College and the University of Toledo, where he majored in English Literature. Presently living in Euclid, Ohio, he wrote this article because: "I wanted to examine some of the reasons that seem to exist for certain aspects of the Corps' basic structure of unity and esprit."

coach goes about building up his team from the roster of his squad—is just about the same material available in 1942. The youth of today may be more “service-wise” than his earlier counterpart, but his mechanisms of loyalty remain the same. He will follow a wise, strong and skillful leader. That is why the Boot Camp DI is such an important individual in the Corps’ system. Most recruits will certainly judge the Corps from patterns and impressions established at Recruit Depots. If, after leaving the Depots, subsequent superiors fail to measure up to the DI, the disillusionment is real and rapid. It is all the more rapid and damaging when, after the relative intimacy of boot camp leadership and discipline, the Marine is flung into an organization run by machine records and a colorless administrative substitute for active leadership. I believe something of the sort occurs today in almost every case and a great many personnel problems can be traced to it.

In 1953 and 1954 the Corps—faced with the problem of the alarming rate of departure of first (and even longer) term enlisted men as well as officers and senior NCO’s to civilian life—instituted a planned program of individual interviews with men about to be discharged. The frank purpose of this program was to attempt to lay some groundwork by which the men concerned could be influenced into shipping over. The success of these interviews depended upon the skill and application of the interviewer, and it was interesting to note that, with few exceptions, these interviews represented the greatest amount of time that many officers had ever spent in talking face to face with enlisted men about their problems and attitudes with respect to the Marine Corps. In that sense, the program was very successful.

In many cases it was difficult, but not impossible, for a reserve officer about to be released himself, to put his heart into this thing. If he reflected about it at all, he found few instances in his own case where any of his interested superiors in the regular establishment had taken any time to talk to *him* about the same things he was expected to touch upon in his talking to the men. Thus the program was seriously



“Administrative expediency”—Occupational disease?

short-circuited. It could be said that the side-effects were far more productive than the announced objective. Whether the Corps itself made any use of this is a moot question.

Let’s suppose that, by means of some mysterious process, at one moment every piece of paper relating to administrative matters in the Corps’ files and manuals were rendered completely blank. Incredible confusion would result at first. However, I believe that those officers and NCO’s endowed with perhaps long dormant though superior senses of responsibility and decision, would quickly rally and do the things necessary to be done to bring about order. The crisis would be most embarrassing in the administrative headquarters of certain units, where those who had leaned long on “the Book” as a substitute for individual responsibility would suddenly find themselves bereft of guidance and with nothing whatever to do. Yet in a very real sense it would not be their fault.


Civilized man constantly seeks better and easier ways of running things and administrative procedures are tools for doing exactly this. The self-reliant individualist is constantly in conflict with this environment, while to the uninspired conformist, it is the breath of life. To the real leadership at the top, administration is a means of getting the routine things done, while the leaders busy themselves with (it is to be hoped) more important matters. Thus the

MOS system is a means of rapid classification of the tasks necessary to the accomplishment of the Marine Corps’ mission. It has nothing whatever to do with the manner or spirit in which these tasks are performed. It does succeed, however, in seriously limiting and depressing the spirits of the men performing the tasks. It has either a neutral effect or a negative effect. As such it performs no positive function at all, except to serve as a model to those who prize administrative method above all else.


For it is entirely probable that there will come a time when a leader shall stand apart. His emergency equipment will lie shattered about him; his electronic gear silent and useless. Supporting fires will be denied him. That man will shake his head grimly to clear his brain of shock and confusion. He will heft a hand-weapon in his fists and the sound of his own shout will carry around him. (It will be a familiar shout. It sounded from the fighting top of *Bon Homme Richard*; through the bullet-swept bracken of Belleau Wood; down the sun-parched streets of Ocotla; up the steep beach at Iwo Jima; and in the freezing, paralyzing night at Chosin . . .)

In the echo of that shout, a ragged line of men will move forward in the tense, familiar crouch of battle. There will no longer be an MOS among them. This will be “general service.”

USMC



NEW TANK FIRING RANGE



Tiny tank silhouettes, racing at speeds up to 50 miles-per-hour, serve as clay pigeons for Army gunners parked in tanks 200 feet away. The US 3d Armored Division stationed at Friedburg, Germany set up this new type of range for tank gunners.


Operators in a tower behind the firing line control the targets and can maneuver them forward and backward and up and down inclines imitating actual tank movements. The gunners use only the .30 caliber machine gun, loaded with quick disintegrating "frangible" ammunition as a safety precaution.




A series of baffles holds down rico-

chets and, for extra safety, gun barrels are restricted by cables and iron bars which prevent shots from going out of the firing area.

The targets are collapsible, toppling when hit and being flicked upright by a cog when they reach the end of the range on their track.

The target area consists of 4 tables at 10-yard intervals. The tables rise 3 feet per table. The first table carries targets along a horizontal line. The second and third line target tracks slant upward from right to left and vice versa, respectively.







The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

THE CIVIL WAR, A Soldier's View—Col G. F. R. Henderson. Edited by Jay Luvass. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. \$6.00

This is a collection of hitherto scarce writings by a British army officer who was a great military historian. Jay Luvass has assembled the text and original maps of the classic, *The Campaign of Fredericksburg* (1886); 4 chapters from the posthumous collection of essays and lectures, *The Science of War* (1905); and an almost forgotten essay which appeared in Mary Anna Jackson's *Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson* (1895). Col Henderson (1854-1903) is no stranger to Civil War specialists.

LEE'S DISPATCHES TO JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1862-1865—Edited by Douglas Southall Freeman & Grady McWhiney. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. \$5.00

Practically unobtainable since the limited publication of 750 copies in 1915, this volume contains new material as well as an added foreword by Grady McWhiney. When purchased by W. J. DeRenne, of Georgia, the letters were pasted in one volume and the telegrams in another. From internal evidence it appeared that these dispatches and telegrams were from a file kept for his own use by President Davis. The letters broaden our view of Lee's strategy and throw significant light on disputed movements.

ESCAPE OF THE AMETHYST—C. E. Lucas Phillips. Coward-McCann, New York. \$3.95

On a quiet day in April, 1949, HMS *Amethyst* was proceeding on a peaceful mission up the Yangtze River when she was set upon by a Chinese Communist battery and almost sunk before she could fire a gun in her defense. This assault was the beginning both of an international incident of major proportions and a story of gallantry and endurance. This is the story.

AIR DATES—Air Commodore L. G. S. Payne. Frederick A. Praeger, New York. \$7.50

This is a chronological survey of the principal events in the fields of civil and military aviation, beginning in 1783 and ending on 31 Dec 1956. While the approach is British, coverage of events in the United States and on the international scene is thorough. The major part of the work concerns itself with the years 1939 to 1956. The author has been director of Air Intelligence at the British Air Ministry and is the Air Correspondent to the London Daily Telegraph.

THE BACKGROUND OF NAPOLEONIC WARFARE—Robert S. Quimby. Columbia University Press, New York. \$6.75

This is a study of French warfare during the 18th Century when the ground was being prepared for the victories of the Napoleonic armies. The entire century was fraught with military controversy, and French arms were not notably successful. The author traces the different ideas that were advanced, studied, accepted or rejected from the War of the Spanish Succession early in the 1700's, to the tactics used at the end of the 18th Century and during the great wars. This is a volume in the Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences.

POWER AND DIPLOMACY—Dean Acheson. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. \$3.00

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson here outlines the map of the second half of our century as it is projected by the course of events, and surveys the dangerous passage across it. He assesses our present plans and recent performance in regard to such things as China, the Near East, our Allies and neighbors, under-developed countries, our own economy and our military and scientific establishments.

A. P. HILL, Lee's Forgotten General—William Woods Hassler. Garrett & Massie, Richmond, Va. \$3.95

This is the first biography of the Confederacy's long-neglected hero who Lee ranked next to Jackson and Longstreet. Although the name and deeds of this gallant Virginian conspicuously punctuate the record of every major campaign of the Army of Northern Virginia, the man himself has persistently remained what Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman termed an "elusive personality." Dr. Hassler has compiled an interesting documentary study from which emerges a balanced portrait of this distinguished but complex character.

REPORTING THE WARS—Joseph J. Mathews. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. \$6.50

Professor Mathews traces the development of war news coverage for the last 200 years. War news is inseparably associated with the forces of censorship and propaganda, and the author gives full consideration to this problem. Illuminating examples of war correspondence, ranging from a newsbook description of a battle in the Thirty Years War to the broadcast from a bomber over Normandy on D-Day 1944 are given. A professor of history at Emory University, the author served with the Navy during WWII.

MR. LINCOLN'S WASHINGTON—Stanley Kimmel. Coward-McCann, Inc., New York. \$7.50

Here in over 65,000 words of text based on contemporary Washington newspaper accounts, and more than 260 pictures, many of which have not been published before, is a picture history of Abraham Lincoln as President and the tumultuous years of the Civil War as seen from the nation's capital. Both pictures and text complement each other, and the result is an interesting and original portrayal of Lincoln as President and the Civil War era.



COMPONENT, PRICELESS, AIR FORCE...an Air Force pilot is an investment in time and money which must be protected. He is an irreplaceable link in the chain of defense upon which our nation's security rests. But to the United States Air Force a pilot is more than a set of dog tags. He's your wing man...your buddy in the next bunk...a priceless member of your team. He deserves, and gets, all the protection the United States Air Force can provide. One new way will be with Kaman H-43 crash rescue helicopters... on the alert anytime...anywhere.

THE **KAMAN** AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
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Capt McLane Tilton, USMC

Beginning in this issue, and to be published in
two parts, is the dramatic and heretofore
untold story of a dedicated Marine officer



Capt McLane Tilton

and the Korean Incident of
1871

By Maj C. F. Runyan


Part I

Foreword

✿ IT HAD BEEN 5 YEARS SINCE THE LAST ROUND WAS FIRED IN THE CIVIL War and, as in the aftermath of every great conflict, the peaceful years seemed to stretch endlessly into the future. The need for a strong army and navy seemed remote and unnecessary; a part of the nightmarish rebellion past and quickly being forgotten.

The major European nations, with whom the United States had vied for power in this hemisphere, were properly impressed with the awesome display of arms and men the Civil War had given the world. None of America's traditional enemies (or traditional friends) gave any sign of wanting to lock horns with the burgeoning young giant to the west. Even the Indians on the domestic scene were being successfully backed across the Great Plains by the promises of the politicians, the plows of the settlers and the rifles of a few thousand regular army troops. As a result, the funds to sustain the military establishments were slow in coming and grudgingly given by a penny-pinching Congress. In the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, everything was reduced to subsistence level: weapons, facilities, pay and promotion. America was at peace.

But this was a peace of the whole rather than of the parts. In remote, little-known corners of the world, small bands of underpaid American regulars fought savage battles in defense of national honor, to protect American citizens and to open new trading areas for the growing commerce of young industrial America. This is the story of one of those battles—the Korean Incident of 1871—and McLane Tilton, the Marine Corps captain whose men led the American forces.



BGen Jacob Zeilin, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1864-1876

USS *Colorado* and McLane Tilton

It was the 21st of February, 1870 at Brooklyn Navy Yard. Shortly before noon, the Quartermaster of the Watch logged the weather as cold and the sky clear on board the Steam Frigate *Colorado* at her pier berth. At 1345 Lt Bloomfield McIlvaine, USN, Officer of the Deck, glanced down the dock and saw a company of Marines marching erectly through a maze of dockside activity from the Receiving Ship *Vermont*. The new Marine Guard was coming aboard.

Capt McLane Tilton brought his guard of 50 men over the gangplank and turned them over to Orderly Sergeant John O'Neill to take 'tween decks to stow their gear in the cramped space that would be home for most of them for the next 3 years (the duties of Orderly Sergeant were comparable to those of First Sergeant today. The Marine Corps had 50 Orderly Sergeants in 1870). Tilton needed no assistance to find his way to his stateroom. The *Colorado* was an old acquaintance to him, having served aboard her as a second lieutenant in '61 and '62

when the ship was with the West Gulf Blockading Squadron under Adm David Farragut. The forward stateroom on the port side was that of the Senior Engineer; aft of that was the Paymaster's; then the Ship's Surgeon's; the next stateroom was set aside for the Senior Marine Officer.

The USS *Colorado* (1st Rate) was a good ship, though somewhat past her prime. When launched in June, 1856 at the Gosport (Norfolk) Navy Yard, the *Colorado* and the ships of her class were considered to be the superiors of any men-of-war in the world. In 1870 this was no longer true. Small by modern standards—3,400 tons and 263 feet in length—wooden and fully ship-rigged for sail, she was equipped with relatively crude, balky steam engines as auxiliary power. These engines were used for steaming in and out of ports, across calm stretches of sea and to lend additional maneuvering qualities in storms and in battle. In calm water, with steam alone, the *Colorado's* speed was rated at 8.87 knots, but her lack of armor would

have been fatal in a fight with a 1st Rate English or French iron-clad.

Although Tilton himself seemed to be satisfied with the physical characteristics of the *Colorado*, there is no evidence that he was pleased with his assignment aboard her. Not that he protested officially, nor was he the type to bemoan his fate even in his personal correspondence to his wife. Nevertheless, the *Colorado*, in this winter of 1870, was being fitted out for a 3-year cruise on the Asiatic Station. Tilton, though nearly 34 years old, had only been married three and a half years to Nan Tilton, a girl considerably younger than he. Their first child, John Gibson Tilton, had been born only 7 months before Tilton marched his Marines aboard the *Colorado*. Neither "Nannie" nor "Johnnie" was robust, and their welfare and comfort was to prove a constant source of worry and strain to McLane Tilton.

Hard as this pending separation might seem, Tilton had little basis for official complaint. Tours of sea duty in a later Marine Corps would become relatively infrequent, but in 1870 a Marine officer was only slightly less sea-going than his brother naval officer. Of the 20 Captains in the Marine Corps, 10 of them were aboard ships of the Navy. The simple mathematics of this decreed that a junior Marine Corps officer was a true amphibian; half his time spent on land and half his time spent at sea.

In the 6 weeks remaining before the *Colorado* was to leave New York for the Asiatic Station, Tilton found plenty to keep him busy. It was his responsibility that sufficient clothing of both summer and winter issue, fatigue and dress, arms, ammunition and accoutrements, were laid in for the duration of the cruise. To repay him for this, the Marine Corps reimbursed him \$10 a month additional "for responsibility of clothing, arms, and accoutrements when commanding guard of vessels in commission, with a complement of 40 marines." It was also his responsibility to train the guard for extended duty in foreign lands to display, in accordance with Secretary of the Navy Robeson's instructions, "... that armed force which makes the strongest appeal to Asiatic respect." Since

Como Perry's successful breach of the Japanese wall of isolationism, many fleet commanders felt that nothing appealed to Asiatic respect quite like the display of disciplined rows of tall, well-trained Marines.

Unfortunately, Tilton himself was out of place among any group of tall men, being barely 5'4" in height. This didn't seem to bother him noticeably, for he arranged at a later date during the voyage to have the ship's photographer take a picture of Pvt Thomas Little, the tallest man on the *Colorado*, side by side with Tilton who forwarded it to his wife with instructions to put it on the mantelpiece at home "as a curio." (Pvt Little was 6'3" tall. He was discharged from the Marine Corps in 1874 after 12 years' service as "worthless.") However, the Marine captain's small stature was considerably less noticeable aboard the *Colorado* in 1870 than it would have been aboard navy ships of the future. The average height of the sailors aboard the *Colorado* was about 5'5" and a six-footer was a rarity. Marines as a group were much taller than the seamen of the day, due to the minimum height requirement of 5'5" for enlisted Marines as against a minimum of 4'8" for seamen.

Regardless of Tilton's size, there is little doubt that he was a capable Marine officer for his day. His formal training to become an officer was a short indoctrination period of less than 2 months at Headquarters in Washington, yet his ability to give any duty assigned him his undivided attention, and his meticulous devotion to detail, would have done credit to the high-caliber training given by future systematized and formal officer schools. (The School of Application was the first formal Marine Corps officers school. The first class convened 1 May 1891 at the Marine Barracks, Washington,

D. C.) Gregarious, witty, and socially punctilious, McLane Tilton had an enormous capacity for making friends wherever he happened to be.

The New Fleet Commander

On the 13th day of May, the chill winds that had blown across the quarterdeck of the *Colorado* in February and March at Brooklyn were remembered with longing by all hands, for today the weather was hot and the breeze slack as the ship sailed south across the equator. There were a number of "shell-backs" aboard, but as usual with a ship making its first long voyage with a new crew, there were many novices waiting to meet His Majesty, King Neptune. Among them was Capt McLane Tilton, who described the scene in one of his letters to his wife:

"... We crossed the equator on the 13th of this month. According to custom it was a great event for the crew and many of the novices among the officers. At 5 in the evening all hands were called to muster on the Quarterdeck. When all assembled, the Articles of War were read. Presently we heard an awful "Ship Ahoy" sung out from forward and turning we observed Neptune and his Tritons and Mrs. Neptune all dressed fantastically just coming over the bow. The sentinels were stationed at the ladders to prevent anyone going below, as the fun of the thing lay in tarring and shaving everybody who had not a certificate of having crossed the line before. Neptune in his chariot (on wheels) with Mrs. Neptune seated behind was then drawn to the Quarterdeck and his Majesty enquired what ship this was. When the Captain stepped forth and told who she was and all about us and welcomed them on board in the name of the Admiral who paid tribute in sherry wine. All

the officers were then called out one after the other and Neptune graciously exempted each and every one of them from shaving, if they would pay tribute which all of course did by pulling out a bottle of wine and forking it over. Then the fun commenced. A large hose was hooked to a pump, and a basin formed by a great tarpaulin put in the gangway and filled with a thousand gallons of water. The Neptune people, all disguised of course, then "went for" the crew, greasing and tarring them with a whitewash brush and shaving them with a razor as big as a scythe, after which in the most unconscionable manner one after the other was thrown in the water and the hose turned on them, amidst the greatest hilarity. Some swore, some begged and many cried, a great many fought but they were of course overcome by force and made to submit, those resisting of course getting the worst of it. So much grease and tar I have never seen before. They were perfectly filled with it; heads, face, ears and all. You can imagine the scene. . . ."

It was August before the *Colorado* entered the anchorage at Singapore; over 4 months since leaving New York Harbor. Here the command of the Asiatic Fleet was to change hands and the *Colorado* to become flagship of the fleet. Singapore was the approximate geographic center of the vast reaches of the Asiatic Station. If RAdm John Rodgers, the new Commander-in-Chief, had wanted to tour the perimeter of the Asiatic Station from Singapore, the *Colorado* would have had to turn south and pass around Australia to Van Dieman's Land (Tasmania), then turn north and sail up the eastern coast of Australia through the Coral Sea, and on through the South and Central Pacific, across the equator and continuing north until reaching the Bering Straits at the Arctic Circle; then westward to the Russian coast in the Sea of Okhotsk; southward past the Kuriles, past Japan and down the coast of China, through the South China Sea and along the coast of the Malay Peninsula, across the Bay of Bengal to India; along the Indian coastline to the Persian Gulf, then south to the Gulf of Aden and past the Suez Canal, and finally, a long southward trek along the east



Maj Runyan enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1940 and was commissioned in 1946. In 1952 and 1953 he served as Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachments on the USS *Breckinridge* and the USS *Essex*. He later commanded a rifle company in the 3d MarDiv, and served as Assistant S-3 of the 1st Marines, 1st MarDiv, in Korea. He attended Michigan State College in 1938 and 1939 and is now attending the University of Maryland. His present assignment is: Head, Officer Planning and Distribution Unit, Detail Branch, HQMC.

coast of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope — the western limit of the Station. 54,000,000 square miles of water and coast line! This was the area of responsibility throughout which Adm John Rodgers, 1500 officers, seamen and Marines on 7 wooden

ships were to be charged with the protection of the lives and property of American citizens.

The Flagship *Delaware*, its officers and crew and RAdm Stephen C. Rowan, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet were already at

Singapore, impatiently awaiting Rodgers and the *Colorado*. Due to the importance of events occurring on the Station, it was to take several days of conferences between the two Admirals and the relieving and to-be-relieved Fleet Officers before the formal relief took place.

Tilton took advantage of the few days in port to exchange the overpowering heat of the ship for the strange sights and sounds of the British colony. He found that Capt George S. Collier, USMC,

Crossing the equator in 1870.

"... and shaved them with a razor as big as a scythe ..."



the outgoing Fleet Marine Officer ("... The senior Marine officer in each squadron shall be recognized and considered as Fleet Marine Officer." Navy Department Circular, 29 Sept 1866) and he could discuss the problems of the Asiatic Station more comfortably over cooling drinks under slow-moving palmetto fans at the English hotels. Besides that, the oppressive heat convinced Adm Rodgers that the officers should go ashore in "citizens' clothes," and the light cotton civilian clothing was far more adapted to the climate than the uniforms.

This was just one facet of the Admiral's character for which Tilton and the officers and men of the Fleet respected and liked John Rodgers. The consideration that he invariably showed for the comfort, safety and well-being of his sailors and Marines was combined with a vast store of tactical knowledge, strategic sense and cool personal courage. The scion of a famous military family, and son of Como John Rodgers who commanded with distinction in the Tripolitan War and the War of 1812, Rodgers had an outstanding record in the Union Navy during

the Civil War and was generally considered to be one of the Navy's finest officers.

The new Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was 58 years old the day he assumed command, and his personal appearance reflected his warm nature rather than his ability to wage shrewd, courageous battles. Of average height, portly, with white hair and a cherubic face, the old gentleman's Churchillian appearance tended to inspire complacency in his adversaries, usually to their regret. Tilton often referred to him as a "dear old fellow" and the Admiral returned the Marine officer's high regard, seldom failing to include the young captain on the guest list for the little parties and soirees ashore and in his big cabin aboard the *Colorado*.

did not have the capability to cope with the troublesome potentialities lying restlessly beneath the surface of the teeming oriental millions. In Rowan's opinion, and this was reflected among the other Fleet Commanders, the demonstrations against the Westerners, the rioting and massacres, were not spontaneous expressions of the mass of the people, but the calculated result of the growing nationalism of the Chinese leaders and literati.

Adm Rowan showed Rodgers the note he had received from the French Consul in Singapore telling of the frightful massacre of the French priests and nuns at Tientsin a little more than 3 weeks before. He went on to say that the French Consul had told him privately that the French government had issued an ultimatum to Prince Kung, the Chinese Foreign Minister, demanding 4,500,000 pounds sterling, and decapitation of the Governor and the principal Mandarin at Tientsin and delivery of their heads, and finally, occupation of Tientsin and Taku (site of forts on the Hai River, guarding the approaches to Tientsin) by French troops for 5 years in reparations for this outrage.

On 20 August, RAdm John Rodgers assumed command of the Asiatic Fleet and the attendant responsibility for protecting American interests over one-quarter of the world's surface.

The Asiatic Station

The long tour on the Asiatic Station was beginning. The ships of the American Squadron covered thousands of nautical miles sailing from port to port in the vastness of the Station—Japan, Formosa, Korea, the Philippines, but mostly between the noisy, dirty, stinking ports of China. There was no perceptible pattern to these movements, nor any purpose that was apparent to the men who sailed on the ships. And yet, to the best of Adm Rodgers' considerable professional skill, and to the limit to which 7 small ships and their crews could strive, the interests of young America were being upheld in the Orient. As Secretary of the Navy, George M. Robeson, wrote in his Annual Report for 1870:

"... The feeling of uncertainty and alarm which at this time per-

During the discussions that quickly got under way between the two Admirals, Rowan tended towards pessimism about conditions on the Station. Two of the gunboats of the Fleet, the *Maumee* and *Unadilla*, he reported, were so unseaworthy that they were incapable of navigating between principal ports on the Station, much less capable of making the long voyage home. He had reported the condition of the two ships to the Secretary of the Navy, and had received the Department's approval for their sale in the Far East. Negotiations were now in progress on this matter.

The remainder of the Squadron

vades all the European settlements in China extends to our own commercial and religious representatives, and the bulk of our Asiatic Fleet is now cruising in that portion of the station for the protection of any interests which may be threatened. . . ."

To show the American flag in as wide an area as possible, the ships of the Fleet had to be dispersed, and it was seldom that more than 2 ships were in company in a single port, and more often there was only one. But to the Chinese Mandarin, steeped in his own autocratic interests, there appeared to be a continuous stream of armed American warships sailing in and out of Chinese ports.

On the personal level, there were compensations for the American Marines and bluejackets serving with the Fleet. They were serving in lands so strange as to be legendary to the average American of the day. The tales they would bring back would be told to their children, their grandchildren and a few, with the sound of airplanes overhead in their old ears, would live to tell their great-grandchildren of the strange places they had visited in the old wooden ships with the white sails cracking overhead, and of the heathen peoples they had seen and the strange way they lived. McLane Tilton, bewildered by the terrible yet fascinating China of 1870, wrote his wife of the things he had seen:

"... I think I told you how the coolies lay on the docks in the hot broiling sun, in a state of nudity, and sleep as soundly as if they were in feather beds. They tell me the winters are so severe these poor people are often found frozen to death in the streets and on sampans (or small batteaux) and in odd corners of lots and buildings where they gather to keep themselves warm at night. Their condition is dreadful and the Mandarins take care to keep them so, lest they may ever be able to endanger the positions of the governing classes, and how this populous country is to be made better is the great question always before thinking people of the West; a problem far from solution, and as grave as one as exists on the face of the earth. You can form no idea of the denseness necessary in the distribution of the four hundred and fifty



RAdm John Rodgers, Comdr in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, 1870-1873

millions of people composing the Celestial Empire. Go in any direction through the country and you will never be out of sight of a village. On the plains, the farmers cluster together for mutual protection against roving bands of robbers, and the sites of the little villages of four, five or ten houses are embellished with trees and vines, the only woods ever seen here, the scarcity of which is so great that I have never yet seen a fence anywhere I have been. . . .

"Labor is very cheap indeed. Six

mechanics can be hired for a dollar a day, or for about sixteen cents apiece, and many luxurious bachelors I know who employ two coolies at night, one to pull the "punker" or large fan, and the other to brush the flies and mosquitoes away during the night. For three cents one of these itinerants will follow you half a day in your shopping excursions, carry such loads on their thin bones as to put our European porters to shame. . . ."

By this time, Capt McLane Tilton was thoroughly familiar with his

Marines and, with some exceptions, was pleased with the Guard. The junior officer of the Guard was 2dLt William J. MacDonald, Jr., a tall, elegant young man whose aristocratic features set well above his uniforms which were, like his commission, less than 2 years old. In spite of his inexperience, within a year 2dLt MacDonald was to prove his worth under fire and receive favorable mention from his Commanding Officer. In another 9 years, in 1879, MacDonald was to decide that promotion in the Marine Corps was hopelessly slow and submit his resignation after 11 years in grade as a lieutenant. MacDonald may have been far-sighted at that. The officer next junior to him was not promoted to captain until 1890. MacDonald would have had nearly 22 years in grade as a lieutenant before being promoted to captain.

There were some raw recruits among the men, but there was a sizeable nucleus of veterans. Tilton's first sergeant, Orderly Sergeant John O'Neill, a blue-eyed, balding Irishman from Antrim County, Ireland, had shipped into the Corps in 1855 and had over 15 years service. He handled the Guard with a rough competency, got the monthly muster rolls out on time and handled the simple administration of the guard without too much supervision by the officers. Tilton was glad to have the sure hand of this veteran NCO shaping the Guard in its early days.

The Guard's next senior NCO was Sgt Patrick Flynn, another Irishman who had been born in County Tipperary in 1838. A slight man of average height, Flynn had little or no formal education and could barely write his own name. When he came aboard the *Colorado*, Sgt Flynn was 32 years old and had 9 years service in the Marine Corps. Tilton was somewhat doubtful of Flynn's ability as a non-commissioned officer, as Flynn tended to be reluctant to use his authority. The men of the Guard (and Capt Tilton too) found it disconcerting to look directly into Flynn's eyes; one being distinctly grey and the other a bright blue.

The third-ranking sergeant was Sgt John Moll. Moll was one of the younger NCOs in the Guard and undoubtedly the ablest. Born in Hamburg, Prussia, in 1848, he was

well-educated, disciplined and tough as nails. Nearly 6 feet in height, with brown eyes, dark hair and complexion, Moll was one of those rare individuals, who, by virtue of tremendous natural ability and a forceful personality manage to stand out among any group of men. Moll's ability as a Marine and his rapid rise to sergeant were no doubt due, in large part, to compulsory military service in the Prussian Army. Capt Tilton felt that he could trust Sgt Moll to carry out any detail promptly and efficiently.

The heat of the late China summer was nearly prostrating, and the ship's routine was adjusted to tropical hours. The crew arose at dawn and went to cleaning stations or performed necessary ship's work. At 0800 breakfast was served for all hands, and after breakfast the Marines tidied themselves and their equipment in preparation for quarters and drill at 0930. After inspection the Marines would be drilled for an hour, either at the manual of arms, facings or at the ship's great-guns. Lunch was served at 1130 and in port, liberty was sounded for the section off watch at 1300. The duty section performed only a minimum of work during the heat of the afternoon, the major effort being spent in desperate search of a stray cooling breeze. The officers' routine varied little from that of the men, except that the hour of rising was considerably later. For Tilton, many afternoon and evening hours were spent sweating over courts-martial papers in the closeness of his stateroom. Besides being Fleet Marine Officer, he was Judge Advocate of the Asiatic Fleet, which required that he prosecute all general courts-martial awarded on any ship of the Fleet. He wrote of the drabness of shipboard life in another letter to his wife:

"... I get up about eight dripping with perspiration and feel as if I had been sleeping in a furnace. Take off my flannel night clothes, hang them up to dry, then rub myself vigorously with a coarse towel, until the exercise brings all the moisture out of my body. Then I take a bath in my tin pan with plenty of soap, after which I get a piece of sour bread, a cup of awful weak coffee, and two or three doubtful "biled eggs" as my boy calls

them. Then at 9:30 we go to quarters and drill, and then at 11:30 we have a repetition of 8:00 breakfast with addition of a tough beefsteak or mutton chop. After $\frac{3}{4}$ hour exercise masticating these delectable viands in our steaming wardroom, we break out in another perspiration, and wear on till one o'clock when if we are strong enough every other day, we go on shore in the regular boat, and return at eleven at night provided the wind and tide admits. . . ."

His letter continues:


"... I have been almost overwhelmed with courts-martial duties, one court being in session for a whole week, averaging sixty pages record a day which was rendered still more irksome by the heat of the weather and the dampness. I was just congratulating myself upon having a rest, when tonight I had another notice that a court convenes day after tomorrow for the trial of one of the *Benecia's* men for nearly murdering a Chinaman on shore. . . ."

Violence and Isolation

In 1871, while the other nations of the Orient were opening their doors to trade with the West, the Hermit Kingdom of Korea still clung tenaciously to its traditional isolationism. Jealous of its incredibly ancient culture, and resentful of the technological advances of the younger nations of the West, Korea was determined to remain aloof from the rest of the world. All attempts of European nations to establish trade relations with the country had failed, and with the exception of China, Korea had cut herself off from the outside world, both culturally and commercially.

In principle, Korea was tributary to China, and the Chinese Empire was presumed to exercise a loose form of suzerainty over the smaller kingdom. The Korean people tended to look upon China as the mother country, and an ordinary Chinese traveller was regarded in Korea as a privileged personage. When emissaries from the respected and feared Court of Peking came to the Korean capital, the King left his palace, went humbly outside the gates of the city and exchanged bows with the representatives of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of China.

There were annual trading cara-



USS Colorado — Flagship of the Asiatic Fleet

vans from Korea to China that went by land from Seoul and Pyongyang to Peking on large trains of camels laden with Korean products—paper, ginseng, cloth, etc., for trade to obtain the finer products of China. The Chinese permitted these trading expeditions to remain in Peking 3 months of each year, and they were then required to return to Korea. Other than this, and a tenuous and expedient thread of correspondence with Japan, Korea was utterly isolated from the outside world. Some of the reasons for this national antipathy to the rest of the world are contained in a letter dated April, 1871, from the Korean government in answer to an American request to open negotiations for a commercial treaty:

"... Heretofore foreign nations have been in ignorance of the character and productions of this country, and we have been repeatedly pestered with applications for commercial intercourse; but that is entirely out of the question with this country, and that merchants would not find it profitable is set forth . . .

as follows: It is universally known that our humble state is a small dependency in a corner of the seas, that the people are poor and the articles of commerce scanty; that the precious metals and precious stones are not found here, while grains and cloth fabrics are not abundant; that the productions of the country are insufficient to meet domestic wants, and if they are permitted to flow out abroad, thus impoverishing us at home, this insignificant land would certainly be in extreme danger, and difficult to protect from ruin; furthermore, that the habits of the people are sparing and plain, the workmanship rude and poor; and that we have not a single article worthy of commerce with foreign nations."

This policy of reclusion erupted into extreme violence during the 1860s. The first efforts at westernization of Korea were made by the French Catholic clergy during the first half of the 19th Century. Despite edicts to the contrary, these French priests had for years been proselyting among the Koreans, and had made successful inroads into

the national religion by converting thousands of the people to Catholicism, despite the opposition of the government.

In January, 1866, Russia sent a gunboat to the kingdom and demanded freedom of trade. For some reason this touched off particularly violent anti-Occidental and anti-Christian feelings at the court of the Taewon'gun (loose translation: "Great Prince of a Noble House"), the father of the King and Prince Regent during the King's childhood. The Taewon'gun was bitterly isolationist by nature and nursed a violent hatred of all westerners. With very little urging the Regent allowed his anti-Christian proclivities to assume active form. He ordered the arrest of every priest that could be discovered in the country. During February and March, 1866, he tortured and decapitated the entire French clergy with the exception of 3 priests who managed to conceal themselves. One of these, by the name of Leedel (phonetic) ultimately reached the coast and put to sea in a junk with 11 native Christians,

and eventually landed at Chefoo, China where he reported the murder of the priests. The French authorities were unable to mount a punitive expedition to take action at this time because of the difficulties they were having in Cochin-China.

In September, 1866, the destruction of the American schooner *General Sherman* and the murder of her crew at the hands of the Koreans shocked the American public and focused the attention of the United States Government on the need to negotiate a treaty which would protect American commercial interests in the area.

Precise details concerning the destruction of this ship and the total massacre of her crew will remain forever shrouded in mystery. The only witnesses to what happened


during the last fateful days of the *General Sherman* in the flood-swollen waters near Pyongyang are long since dead, and the written accounts that still exist are Korean and vary greatly in detail. However, although the Korean reports were not translated until nearly 70 years after the tragedy, there are certain facts which recur in the reports frequently enough to indicate that the American ship and her crew met their fate in the following manner:

The *General Sherman*, with 3 Americans, 2 Englishmen, 16 Chinese and 2 Malays aboard, arrived at the mouth of the Taedong River with a cargo of cotton goods, glass, tin plate and other standard gear for trading purposes. The presence aboard of an English clergyman, the Reverend R. J. Thomas, bespoke of trouble in light of the


recent anti-Christian terrorism, and may in fact have been a significant factor in dooming the ship and crew.

The vessel managed to proceed unmolested up the Taedong because of its size and the speed with which it passed fortifications at the mouth of the river. Upon reaching Pyongyang the ship anchored—the Captain not knowing that the river was unnaturally deep due to the seasonal rains—and then grounded on a sand bar as the waters receded. There was nothing the crew could do to free the ship; it was hopelessly stranded and had careened over on one side.

What might have happened had the officers and crew acted with circumspection can never be known, but certainly their chances for survival would have been increased. Several accounts relate that the



Marine Guard of a ship of the old Navy



A group of officers of the USS Colorado. Capt George H. Cooper, USN, CO, is standing in center. 2d Lt William J. MacDonald, Jr., USMC, is the clean shaven officer sitting to left center

sailors molested Korean women near the stranded ship. It is also known that the Reverend Thomas could speak enough Korean to make himself understood, and he may have permitted his missionary zeal to further alienate the violently anti-Christian elements among the natives. Then, too, it seems that the ship's officers felt it necessary to detain against his will a local official who had rowed out to the stranded vessel. These incidents convinced the Koreans that their antipathy to foreigners was well-founded, and an attack was organized against the *General Sherman* from the shore and from small boats launched on the river. For a time the crew, with ample stores of guns and ammunition, was able to beat off the attacks. Finally, the Koreans loaded boats

and rafts with wood and set them afire, letting the flaming pyres drift down current until they came to rest against the *General Sherman*. These set the wooden schooner afire and the crew was forced over the sides of the ship and swam and waded ashore with their hands in the air pleading for mercy. Some of them were beaten to death on the spot and the remainder were taken a short distance away and decapitated. Several accounts state that the clergyman was kept in confinement for several weeks, but was eventually killed.

Upon hearing of the tragedy, RAdm Bell, then Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, dispatched Cdr Shufeldt in the USS *Wachusett* to investigate the matter and to demand the delivery of any survivors

from the Korean authorities. Shufeldt was unable to obtain any satisfaction from the officials with whom he talked and because of the lack of force at his disposal, was forced to leave Korea with his mission unaccomplished.

By now, the French had disentangled themselves sufficiently from the Cochin-China troubles to permit sending Adm Roze and a fleet of 7 warships to Korea to extract reparations from the Korean government for the massacre of the French priests. The French Admiral put 160 men ashore on the fortified island of Kangwha-do (at the entrance to the Han River estuary). The Koreans sank junks along the Han River to prevent the fleet from sailing along it to Seoul, and sent 500 reinforcements to the island. These

reinforcements, reputed to be tiger hunters and other hardy fighters, took their stand under the command of Gen Han Songgun in a strongly fortified Buddhist monastery (Chongjok-San) about a mile inland from the south coast of Kangwhado and with an excellent tactical position at the top of a 300-foot cliff. The French forces bravely, if foolishly, attacked the heights and the first Korean volley killed 5 men and wounded more than 30 others. In a few minutes the French survivors were struggling back toward their main positions on the beach carrying their wounded and dead. The Koreans pursued them closely and had not the remaining French force come to the rescue, the battle might well have ended in total destruction of the force. Adm Roze, realizing that the troops at his disposal were not capable of defeating the Koreans in strength, set fire to the town of Kangwha and sailed away.

The effect of this engagement on the Taewon'gun and his court advisors was electric. Satisfied that the dreaded foreigners were not invincible, the Regent ordered a purge of the hated Christian religion. During the next 4 years it is said that 20,000 Christian Koreans lost their lives in the Taewon'gun's attempt to wipe out Catholicism in Korea.

Social Life on the Station

In the Wardroom and below decks of the *Colorado*, the officers and men (except for the Admiral and his staff) gave little thought to the possibility that they might have a rendezvous in Korea to breach the hitherto impenetrable wall of that Hermit Kingdom.

Then as always, their problems were those of the moment. Capt McLane Tilton was worried about his wife and little Johnny back home in Annapolis, Maryland. The pictures of his infant son distressed him; the boy looked so frail and unhappy, sometimes Tilton wondered if the little boy would survive. (He did, to become District Attorney in Norfolk, Va.) His finances worried him, too. The Wardroom mess bill had been running about \$35 a month, which Tilton considered quite reasonable, but with the reduction in pay effective July last, he found himself in debt to the pay-

master for the money he had drawn under the old pay bill before the paymaster had learned of the change. Tilton now drew just \$180 a month consisting of \$150 base pay, plus 10 per cent longevity for his first 5 years of service, and an additional 10 per cent for his second 5 years, which mark he had just passed. It made it very difficult to provide for his little family back home and still maintain the appearances of an officer and a gentleman that the social life on the Station demanded. In his picturesque style, Tilton gave some details of his off-duty hours in a letter home:

"... Mrs. Delong's reception was yesterday, and I graced her lovely parlor with my lovely presence, in my pink kid gloves, choker collar, and the last pair of 'Casady's' shoes which I have left to bless myself with. . . .

"This morning some guests came aboard and breakfasted with our dear old Admiral, who as usual invited me to be one of the party which I of course always accept. Breakfasts out here begin at noon and don't end until 3 or 4 in the afternoon, and are delightful; a fresh breeze blowing through the ports on the upper deck constantly. A French lady also was of the party, whose claret she declared was diluted by me to a charm, but she feared she gave 'verry mooch' trouble, which I of course denied. The poor little woman was in such grief about Belle France, and pitched into my favorite, the Prince of Prussia so severely, that between her and my very tough beefsteak I was thrown in great trepidation. . . ."

About this time Capt Tilton had to shuffle the non-commissioned officers of the *Colorado's* Guard. The *Monocacy* (4th Rate) needed the strong hand of an experienced non-commissioned officer to command its Guard of 13 men. The *Monocacy* didn't rate a Marine officer so the burden of the command and administration fell on the senior non-com. [Gunboats (4th Rate), did not rate a Marine officer to command the guard. By Navy General Order No. 117 of 23 March 1869.] Tilton decided, in all fairness, that the *Colorado's* Orderly Sergeant John O'Neill with his 16 years of service was the best suited for the billet on the *Monocacy*. This decision left the Marine Guard of the *Colorado* with

the 2 sergeants, Patrick Flynn and John Moll. Flynn's illiteracy, added to his other deficiencies, made him an unlikely successor to O'Neill. On the other hand, the black-browed, powerful Sgt Moll was a born leader, though he lacked the experience necessary for independent command of the *Monocacy's* Guard. In fairness to his command, Tilton felt he had no choice but to make John Moll Acting Orderly Sergeant on the *Colorado* over the head of Patrick Flynn. Less than one year later Moll was promoted to Orderly Sergeant; a truly meteoric rise in the days when it was not unusual for men with 20 years' service to retire as corporals and privates.

The Guard of the *Colorado* had some hard-cased individuals in its ranks, one of every four a veteran of the Civil War. Privates John O'Brien and Thomas Jones had served with the 34th US Infantry; William Kasworn, the 95th New York Volunteers; William Thompson, the 51st Ohio Volunteers; James Ward, the 12th US Infantry; Ferdinand Cruse, the 5th US Infantry, and so on. The Corps was developing its quota of dedicated drinkers even then, and Tilton's boys were no exception. The miserable \$13 a month the Congress of the United States had seen fit to reduce their pay to in July was hardly enough for 2 good nights ashore in Chefoo, Yedo, Singapore, Manila, Woosung, Shanghai or some other Godforsaken port with the strange names that the men hardly bothered to learn and never remembered. Off the ship at the afternoon liberty call, clean, shined and happy with a few Mexican dollars jingling in their pockets (Mexican silver dollars were the medium of exchange for the American ships in China at this time). Back on board at midnight, dirty, drunk, cursing and quarreling, with empty pockets; barely able to sprawl into the elusive hammock, hating the gutteral roar of Sgt Moll as he rolled them out at dawn the next morning. Then the long wait for the first of the month and the arrival of the ship's paymaster with his jingling money bags.

Yet, in spite of the lusty nature of their pleasures ashore, the Marines' disciplinary problems were small. Breaches of discipline had to be serious before the Marine offend-

er was brought to mast. Single and double irons were snapped on blue-jackets with great regularity, but the logbook of the *Colorado* doesn't show this punishment given to a member of the Guard.

In contrast with the lower case haunts of his men on their liberty hours, McLane Tilton, as did the rest of the officers of the fleet, moved socially in the highest diplomatic circles on the Asiatic Station. He was again entertained by the American Minister to Japan, the Honorable Mr. Delong and Mrs. Delong. (Mr. Delong was the Chief of Mission to Japan. The rank of Ambassador was not established until 1893):

"... entering the great house found the verandas all covered in with flags and lighted with hundreds of Chinese lanterns, and about twenty of the ladies of the city already there and dancing with the beaux who came out strong, and we had a very elegant party after all, in spite of the rain and mud. Mrs. Delong was as good to me as ever; took Brown and me into the supper room an hour before it was announced, and treated us to the first pick of everything. The table was loaded with elegancies all having been made by her own servants, and the salads and orange webs would have done credit to a Washington party. "... I only mention the ices, jellies, Blanc Monge, Charlottes, French Kisses with elaborate wrappers and sentimental verses inclosed, besides cold duck, turkeys, pheasant, claws of lobster, and the fixin's complete. Our band performed for the dances which alternated between galops, waltzes and lancier. I had the fortune of swinging about 250 pounds around the room in the shape of Mrs. Delong. ... I also danced with the prettiest girl in Yokohama; the

daughter of an English editor here. She is as fresh as a peach, about eighteen, and simple enough to tell me as I swung her around, that I 'darned splendid! We had a very nice time and I got on board about four in the morning and today feel as fresh as a lark. ..."

While the *Colorado* was in Japan and anchored at Yedo (Tokyo), Capt Tilton and some other officers of the Fleet had the unique pleasure of an audience with the Emperor of Japan, or the "Mikado" as Tilton referred to him. The granting of this audience was evidence of a strong Japanese effort to become westernized as rapidly as possible by modifying their age-old customs to more nearly conform to the American and European ideal. To fully understand the extent to which the Japanese went in dropping the barriers and permitting audiences such as this, only a few years before it was death for anyone to look upon the person of the Emperor, and when he travelled abroad, the homes of the people had to be tightly shut-tered.

Tilton's description of the Emperor's reaction to his American visitors is interesting:

"... The Mikado was seated facing us in an arm chair, with his robe of office and a sort of crepe head-dress which stuck stiffly out of his back hair to the height of two feet, being as broad as one's three fingers. To his left stood his sword bearer with his right hand clutching the hilt of a splendid sword held by a sash around his waist. ... To the right of the Mikado was an officer of state standing, who as occasion called passed from and to the Mikado the official speech that was made, which took not more than 5 minutes for both he and the Admiral to deliver. The Admiral was to the right

as we entered, and the rest of us stood in two lines to his left reaching across the room. ... The Mikado seemed immensely cool, and perhaps was about 25 years old.

"After the reading of the documents and translating them, we all bowed, and left by backing so as not to turn our faces from him as we retired, which of course would have been very offensive. ... We all reached terra firma safely, the Mikado remaining rigid in his chair as we retired, but as the last of us were just getting out of his view, he was seen to bend eagerly forward to see what more he could of what must have been strange to him. ..."

But the time was approaching for the state audiences, the receptions, dances, teas, late breakfasts and polite social intercourse of the Station to be left behind, and the dress uniform, the last pair of Cassady's shoes, the high starch collar, and white gloves to be packed away.

The Fleet was being readied for use as an instrument of American policy. Rodgers had received his instructions directly from the Secretary of the Navy. He was to place himself and his ships at the disposal of the American Minister to China, Frederick Low, for the purpose of transporting the Minister to Korea and backing his negotiations for a trade agreement between the American government and the government of Korea. Rodgers' instructions left no doubt as to who would be calling the turns on the expedition. The responsibility for success or failure of the mission was to be Low's. Rodgers' role was to provide a display of force and to furnish the sinews needed to back Low's decisions.

US & MC

Ed: The conclusion of this article will appear next month.



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
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✿ Bell Helicopter Corporation's XV-3 convertiplane recently completed tests successfully in the 40 x 80 foot full-scale wind tunnel at the Ames Laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Moffett Field, Calif. The convertiplane, shown (below)



mounted in the big wind tunnel, was made at Bell's Fort Worth, Tex., plant. For landings and take offs its rotor-propellers are perpendicular to the wing. Once the craft is airborne and conversion air speed is attained, the rotors tilt forward 90 degrees and it operates as a conventional airplane attaining speeds in excess of 170 miles per hour.

✿ An aluminized suit which protects the wearer from temperatures of more than 2000 degrees F., yet is lightweight and flexible, was demonstrated recently in gasoline and propane gas fires staged at the Phillips Petroleum Company re-



finery, Kansas City, Kansas.

The suit, made by Fyrepel Products, Inc., Newark, Ohio, is made of an aluminized glass fiber material. The coating of aluminum is microthin—so thin it cannot be called a foil. The thinness of the aluminum coating—which reflects 95 per cent of the radiant heat—results in flexibility and light weight, permitting the man to work more freely and effectively. (The aluminized finish was developed by Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., St. Paul, Minn.)

Backing up the aluminum coating is a glass fiber material and quilted glass fiber insulation.

Garments coated with aluminum, like the one pictured above but with modifications in the fabric backing and design, have been developed by the US Air Force and Navy for emergency equipment.



✿ The Army's new portable giant camera (above) developed by the US Army Signal Corps in conjunction with The Kalart Co., Inc., Plainville, Conn., can photograph military objectives up to 30 miles away.

An infra-red factor enables the camera to operate in fog, overcast and inclement weather.

When linked to a television camera, the giant 100 inch lens can provide the military with a continual view of battle action and be used to direct artillery fire and missiles on enemy targets.

This model utilizes a beam bending system that bounces light in a "Z" line between 2 internal mirrors, eliminating the long telescopic tube of other long range cameras.

The total weight of the camera is 150 pounds and takes a 5 x 7 negative, either standard cut film holders or 30-exposure roll film and polaroid material. The camera swings 20 degrees from center in a horizontal plane and can be elevated or depressed about 30 degrees.




✿ Pictured above is one of the newest altitude suits designed for use in the F4D "Skyray" type jet aircraft.

The suit, which looks like a storybook space outfit, is made of cotton and nylon, is skin tight and has to be fitted to each individual. It is a partial-pressure suit designed to be used at extremely high altitudes, automatically inflating itself when the cockpit pressure reaches the altitude of somewhere between 40,000 to 45,000 feet.

The new outfit is a one piece affair that covers everything from head to toe and has a helmet that completely covers the back of the neck down to the shoulders. The helmet has a plexi-glass covering that fits over the face making the suit completely air-tight.

✿ The Army Corps of Engineers has developed a unique bulldozer cab (below) that protects the operator from radiation. Made of lead and weighing over 5,000 pounds, the cab will allow engineers to start early clean-up operations of radioactive areas created by nuclear weapons.

The cab accommodates the operator, tractor controls, a radio and special radiation meters. With a crane, 3 men can mount the cab on the tractor in 30 minutes.



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
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OBSERVATION POST

RECRUITING

✶ MCRS, BIRMINGHAM, ALA. — The drill instructors at the Recruit Depot complain, as they pick up each new platoon, "Where, oh where did they scrape the bottom of the barrel for these people?" or "This is the worst looking bunch of humanity I've ever seen."

The cry is heard throughout the Corps, "The quality of the man coming in today isn't what it used to be," or "When I came in they didn't take people like this," etc. Of course the criers are wrong. The standards for enlistment in the Corps are now higher than they've ever been, the selectivity may not be as great, but the standards are higher. So too are the requirements for the mental and, at the recruit depots at least, the physical capabilities of the men enlisted.

Wherever this cry is heard someone eventually gets around to pointing a finger at the man he feels is to blame and all too often, and this I know because I used to be a "finger pointer," the man blamed is the recruiter. When the finger is pointed all within earshot join in and generally agree, the recruiters just aren't doing their jobs right or we'd be getting better men in the Corps.

It is to the officers and men of the Corps who have never served on recruiting duty that I would like to address these remarks as self-appointed spokesman for the officers and men of the 44 recruiting stations throughout the Corps.

We of the Recruiting Service know the problems of the Corps, after all this is only a 3 year tour at most. After that we'll be back in the operating forces and units of the Corps, working with the men we enlisted today. We're out here looking for and trying to sell the type man we'd like to serve with—not just bodies to fill the quota.

But by and large, you, the officers and men of the Corps, are suffering from some illusions which I'd like to clear up. Most of you feel that there are plenty of desirable young men just knocking down the doors of the recruiting stations trying to get in. Well, you're wrong.

I think we'll all agree that for today's

Marine Corps the high school graduate is the most desirable type enlistment. To show you one of the problems the recruiters have, I'd like to cite an example. In 1956, an independent survey run by industry indicated that in Alabama, in that year, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Selective Service, Industry, Business, Colleges and Universities would have a requirement for over 12,000 male high school graduates. The only difficulty encountered was the number of male high school graduates in Alabama that year was less than 9,000.

The young men of America today are not breaking down the doors of any of the Recruiting Services. Every man enlisted today is the result of a selling job by someone; a recruiter, a man home on leave, a veteran of the Corps or a friend of the Corps, nevertheless a selling job.

Since the Corps is competing with not only the other services but with business and industry also, we must have the best possible salesmen do our recruiting. Compared to the other services, we do. We have as a whole, a conscientious and dedicated group of Marines, but the recruiter can carry the ball just so far.

In October, November and December of 1957 there was an extremely low requirement for input into the Marine Corps by the Recruiting Service, but the recruiters continued to work and waiting lists were built for the first time in my station since January 1955. We selected the people we wanted to enlist. Over 90 per cent were enlisted for four years, over 33 per cent were in the top 2 mental groups. We took nothing but the best and for nothing but the longest periods of time.

We were able to do this because quotas were low. They were low because of the cutbacks ordered by the Defense Department. Starting in January, the quotas climbed again. They climbed to a point where the recruiting officers won't be able to be quite as selective. Standards will still be high, but we'll move again to a buyers market. We'll have to offer the man something more; a shorter term of enlistment principally and we'll be forced, if we're going to come close to making the quota, to give the man, instead of the Corps, the benefit of any doubt.

By this time you should be saying, "Well, what's all this got to do with me? I'm not a recruiting officer or recruiter, this is their problem, not mine." There is where you are wrong. The quotas assigned to the Recruiting Service are predicated on the end strength requirement of the Marine Corps for a certain period and take into consideration that approximately 70 per cent of the men whose enlistments expire during that period will not reenlist.

If you are dissatisfied with the quality of the men entering the Corps today, do something about it! Don't just cry about it. Take some positive action. You can, you know. Every man in the Corps today has been sold on the Corps at least once. When was the last time you sold a man on becoming or remaining a Marine? For every man that reenlists above the 30 per cent reenlistment rate, there is a requirement for that many less recruit enlistments. For every man you sell on reenlisting, the Recruiting Service can screen out one more that doesn't completely measure up to either your's or the recruiter's idea of the ideal Marine.

Before you point the finger at the Recruiting Service again about the quality of the men they're sending you today ask yourself, "How many good men did they send me that I let get away? Is the man I'm complaining about replacing a good Marine who was discharged because I didn't sell the good men on reenlisting?" We all know what the answers to these questions should be. If you can't give the right answers then you have failed not only the Marine Corps but the very man you're complaining about.

Think this over and then go out, and act. Sell a man on staying in so we (the Recruiting Service) can be more selective about who we let in.

Capt R. R. Van Cleave

ARMOR IS NOT TANKS

✶ FORT KNOX, KY.—Articles, letters, and observations appearing in the *GAZETTE* repeatedly grossly misuse the term Armor. Marines pride themselves upon the proper use of military terms and it is time the term Armor is properly understood and, I hope, correctly used by Marines. Armor is defined by Webster as defensive arms for the body; anything thought of as an offensive or defensive weapon; protective covering, usually steel plate on ships, forts, aircraft, etc.; any similar protective covering, as a diver's suit, the plate of an armadillo, etc.; and *Armored Forces and Vehicles Collectively*. From the latter we derive the modern term *Armor* as reflected in the organization of the United States and other armies.

Armor is not tanks, individually or collectively. Armor is not tanks alone. Armor is a branch of the United States Army. It is a combat arm with a center and a school of its own in the same manner as the Infantry and Artillery. Armor, organizationally, is a combined arms team composed of tanks, armored infantry, armored artillery, signal, quartermaster, transportation, ordnance, aviation, chemical, and medical elements married into a mobile combat team in which every man, every piece of equipment and each item of supply is mobile.

True, the tank is the heart of Armor. Every element of the division, combat command, task force, or team is tailored to aid and abet the advance of the tank with its inherent firepower, mobility, agility, shock and staying power. Possessing a high degree of mental mobility, and trained to think in terms of miles rather than yards, Armor Commanders utilize the firepower, mobility, shock, violence, and flexibility of a completely mobile weapons system, supported by a mobile logistical system, properly organized, and equipped with extensive communications, to overwhelm the enemy and destroy him before he can react. This is Armor, and when we speak and write of it today we must use the term Armor in its proper perspective. To do otherwise is, among other things, to mislead our juniors and create false impressions among many Marines.

Taking the phrase to defeat armor, or the sentence, "Utilizing recoilless weapons and guided missiles, we can defeat enemy armor," we can come up with 2 possible interpretations. To one Marine, the phrase or sentence may mean that we have ammunition or missiles capable of penetrating and/or obtaining a kill on the armor plate of enemy vehicles. To Marine number 2, the phrase or sentence would mean we have the organization and weapons required to defeat an enemy force of combined arms, 100 per cent mobile, flexibility innate, and aggressively led.

While on the subject of Armor, the Editor's comments on the letter of Capt P. D. Reissner (GAZETTE: July '57) is believed to be misleading. A check of the Armor Center, Armor School, and Armor Board activities fails to reveal any knowledge of Army experiments in air lifting and/or dropping armored vehicles. It is true that under optimum conditions the present M41A1 light gun tank can be air lifted. However, no standard armored vehicle, other than Ontos, can be considered as even ap-

proaching an air lift capability, much less a drop capability. Vehicles in the research and development cycle may afford such a capability as evidenced by testimony before congressional appropriation committees, but not during this tour of duty.

LtCol E. L. Bale, Jr.

MORE ON PAPERWORK

✿ HQMC—Having been closely associated with Marine Corps paperwork problems for the past two years, I found LtCol Pickle's article "Is Paperwork Necessary?" (GAZETTE: Nov 57) to be of greater than normal interest. It is an excellent article and points out quite clearly the strangling effect of expanding paperwork. It should be required reading for all who are in a position to originate a new report or a new form or to take any action which will add to the total paperwork of the Marine Corps.



As LtCol Pickle implied, Ben Franklin's comments about the weather apply as well to Marine Corps paperwork: Everybody talks about it, but no one does anything about it. However, this need not be the case. There may be nothing that anyone can do about the weather other than to predict it with varying degrees of accuracy, but there is plenty that we can do about paperwork — if we sincerely desire to do so.

Thanks to the impetus provided by the 2 Hoover Commissions for the Federal Government and the Litzenberg Board for the Marine Corps, "machinery" now exists for systematically attacking unnecessary paperwork and for controlling necessary paperwork in the Marine Corps. This "machinery" — the Paperwork Management Program — is blue-printed in MCO 5210.8A and can be put to work in any organization, large or small.

The Program furnishes the techniques which can be used to reduce paperwork at the local level. It also provides the means for referring those paperwork problems which are beyond the scope

of the local commander to HQMC for consideration.

However, this "machinery" depends upon the local commander for its effectiveness. It cannot operate at all unless he gives the word. It cannot operate satisfactorily unless he personally assumes an active role.

The importance of the commanding officer's role in reducing paperwork is highlighted in a Type "C" report submitted by the CO, 4th Marines. This report reviewed steps taken by the organization to reduce the administrative workload (or paperwork) so that unit commanders and their staffs could spend a larger proportion of their time conducting and supervising the training of their units.

In view of their significance, the major points selected by this commanding officer as being worthy of mention are summarized here:

- 1) The administrative burden can be reduced in a relatively short time with the expenditure of a reasonable amount of effort through normal command and staff organization, without establishing a special board or committee.
- 2) *Active participation* of the commander is required — not just his interest.
- 3) The active and personal interest and support of the commander at the next higher echelon is necessary to achieve any significant results.
- 4) Interest in the problem must be generated at all levels.
- 5) Reduction of paperwork and substitution of other means for obtaining information resulted in some beneficial by-products. Increased staff visiting has produced a better understanding of the problems of commanding officers and a closer relationship within the organization. Increased command interest and knowledge of administrative and logistical matters has resulted in improvement in both fields.

The "positive action" put forth by LtCol Pickle, the fine principles and techniques propounded by the Paperwork Management Program, and any other approach to the problem can do no more than scratch the surface of the paperwork problem unless the "decisive increment" (See "Initiative," GAZETTE: Nov '57) is added. What is this "decisive increment"? It is *active and vigorous command participation*.

LtCol F. C. Bacon



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So, if you don't get your GAZETTE, write us and tell us about it. We want to deliver the goods!

THE NEED FOR A PRIMARY CORRECTIVE SERVICES MOS

MCAS, EL TORO, CALIF.—The adverse publicity given to the various armed forces activities in recent months, makes it essential that a course of action be undertaken by the Naval Service to make certain there is no repetition of these activities in the future.

From the corrective services standpoint this can only be accomplished by a revision of the Navy Brig Manual's criteria for selection of personnel. The manual desires, if possible, an individual have at least 2 years active service and/or has attained a level of professional qualification by reason of civilian occupation so as to warrant assignment with the minimum of indoctrination and training in the supervision and management of prisoners. The manual also asks that personnel selected be over 20 years of age and possess a high degree of maturity and emotional stability. The only circumstances under which the Navy can expect to obtain qualified civilian personnel with the prior training in the corrective services field, would be in a national emergency or mobilization. Also the average age of the young men enlisting in the services today makes it impracticable for individuals to be assigned this type of duty by reason of the Navy's criteria for brig staffing, which does not consider the fact that by the time an individual has reached the age requirement, he would be ready for release from the services or due to the present promotion programs, would or should have attained advancement to the point that the present tables of organization do not allow excesses of commissioned officers or petty officers to be assigned to one department or activity.

Regardless of what system of selection is being used, there has and always will be the one ultimate end for the military offender; confinement. The specialized nature of duty at places of confinement requires that they be staffed by personnel specifically trained in techniques of control, management, and rehabilitation of prisoners. Successful operation of a brig depends upon careful selection of the officer and enlisted personnel assigned to the duty, their understanding of the basic objectives of the Navy Department's confinement program, and their being schooled in the policies, procedures, and standards given in the Navy Brig Manual.

The intelligent application of the total effort to achieve these objectives requires constant alertness; a high order of imagination, initiative, personal integrity; and above all the use of com-

mon sense and mature judgment at all times by persons concerned with administration of persons in confinement.

Pampering of prisoners is neither required nor desired by the Navy Department, but a high order of discipline is not only desirable, but absolutely necessary to safe and orderly brig operation. Discipline is normally concerned with getting the willing cooperation of prisoners to be punctual and orderly in proceeding to and from places of work or other assignments satisfactorily, and to maintain standards of conduct that are reasonable and necessary among large numbers of closely confined people. To do this, the Brig Administration attempts to develop a positive discipline among the prisoners. This type of discipline promotes a good attitude and voluntary obedience to brig orders, whereas a negative or punitive type of discipline, though recognized as necessary in some cases, leads to difficulty in the control of prisoners. Excluding a negative type of discipline, there are 4 reasons which generally cause disorders among prisoners.

- 1) Crowded living conditions
- 2) Unjust punishment after confinement
- 3) Unsolved grievances
- 4) Juvenile sentries

The first 3 are easily corrected, but the juvenile sentries can only be corrected through careful screening, proper indoctrination, and schooling.

One of the biggest problems among young untrained sentries is getting the point across that prisoners have been confined as punishment and not for punishment. This is only another of the many reasons for training in the Corrective Services field. Nothing can be more disappointing to the officers or senior NCOs in charge of confinement activities, particularly those that take a personal and active interest in their work, than to send a report to a commanding officer upon a prisoner's release that above and beyond the punitive aspects of the confinement, it has not been corrective.

In order for the services to obtain a qualified individual in any of the specialized fields, such as electronics or special weapons, the services think nothing of sending an individual whom they believe qualified to special schools for periods of 6 months or more in order to check vacuum tubes or a firing system. Yet, when they intend to place a man in a position where he must deal with other human beings, all that is necessary is to have him report to the NCO in charge of a confinement activity, read or have him read the orders, acquaint him with the normal routine, and place him in a duty status and then expect the ultimate in human relations and

character guidance.

To assure the proper control and treatment of prisoners through their rehabilitation and training for return to duty, there is a definite need for a Primary Corrective Services MOS. Service schools to give qualified individuals an opportunity to specialize in this vital work, training them in confinement policies and procedures for handling prisoners. The Marine Corps Institute at the present time offers a correspondence course entitled "Corrective Services" available to individuals and commands. I believe that a survey of their enrollment would show the majority of persons applying for the course are senior NCOs and officers that are active in the work and are attempting to improve themselves. These persons are to be commended for their professional interest, but it does not eliminate the basic need to educate junior men who are in direct contact with persons confined.

A probable solution of this problem would be the initiation of 2 service schools, one on the East coast and another on the West coast. The course would last for a period of from 6 to 8 weeks, including both class room and practical experience in confinement activities. The course should contain instructions in the Navy's general policies; the organization and security for brig;

the control and treatment of prisoners; how to cope with special problems/situations that continue to arise with persons in close confinement; psychologically how a prisoner thinks; why he is inclined to commit certain acts in confinement and the effects of confinement on a person. The school should also include training in riot, escape, and fire bill procedures in use at various stations; courses on individual protection and familiarization with the weapons and equipment in use at confinement activities.

As to the selection of personnel for the schools, it should be done as soon as practical, either at the completion of recruit training or as soon as possible thereafter, thereby not giving qualified individuals too much of an opportunity to acquire undesirable traits. Personnel would be selected for their high degree of maturity and emotional stability, general educational development and physical appearance. A general psychiatric evaluation would be necessary to eliminate those persons whose temperament or medical history might disqualify them for the duty. There will always be a need for confinement activities and qualified individuals to operate them. The best operational procedures are only as good as the people that carry them out.

SSgt Charles N. Freeman, Jr.

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Jet Age Supply Procedures

By Col G. D. Morgan

Horse and buggy supply procedures have been booted into the Jet Age by the new Supply Accounting procedures. Emphasis has changed from "You can't get it until I've done my paper work," to "Here it is, I'll do the paper work later."

After a year of study and testing in the 2nd MarDiv and the 2nd MAW, the new procedures are being implemented in the rest of the FMF.


These new procedures kick into oblivion many of the old, conservative granddaddy supply accountable concepts that were so long thought to be immutable. Accelerating some supply operations into this new era may be as tough and as noisy as cracking the sonic barrier, but once accomplished it will be smooth and sweet thereafter.

The new procedures fit hand and glove with the new "M" series T/O's for field supply organization. Battalions and selected squadrons (separate and those in the Marine Wing Service Group) by-pass the regiments

and the aircraft group and will draw supplies directly from division and wing service elements. Regimental and group staffs no longer review, approve, or disapprove the supply requests of their subordinates; furthermore, there is a considerable saving in clerical effort as these staffs no longer maintain a complete set of supply records for lower units, or consolidate lower unit supply requisitions into one.

The elimination of these intermediate echelons expedites supply to lower units, eliminates one echelon of stock record keeping and removes the regimental and group commanders from the detailed house-keeping headaches of their lower units. Furthermore, the overall division and wing mounting-out loads are lightened by the liquidation of large stocks of supplies at these intermediate echelons.

Gone forever are the cumbersome memorandum receipts. Formerly, the accountable officer initially pre-





pared long and complicated listings of accountable property for signature by lower unit supply officers. In turn these officers prepared new memorandum receipt listings for signature by still lower unit officers and the process was again repeated until finally the lowest echelon was reached.

In lieu of the memorandum receipt a simple custody card record for each property item (less repair parts) valued at more than \$25.00 is maintained at the lowest supply and responsible officer level (all battalions and all squadrons not now having a supply officer in their T/O will designate an officer for this purpose until their T/O's are modified). There is no "accountability" as such by a lower unit supply officer to a higher unit supply officer and in turn by this unit supply officer to a still higher one.

In the future the new responsible officer will accompany the old responsible officer on a sight review of the property on custody card receipt. After verification, the new officer will visit the office of the supply officer and compare custody cards and initial those of the supply officer in all cases of agreement. In the event of a disagreement the supply officer will make appropriate recommendations to his commanding officer relative to the action to be taken on the missing property. These verification checks are the sole responsibility of the lower unit commanding officer and his unit supply officer and are not subject to detailed verification and consolidation at each of the higher command and supply echelons.

Accountability, as previously known, has been eliminated. Formerly, the supply accountable officer was personally and pecuniarily responsible for all property carried

in his supply account. His monetary responsibility was emphasized by a bond which he was required to execute and pay for himself. This heavy emphasis on responsibility led to unnecessary controls, delays in supply action and the like, in the interest of self-protection.

The new supply concept establishes "accountability" as a part of command responsibility as it properly should be. The lower unit commander is responsible that supplies requisitioned are proper and when received that they are handled with due care and diligence in protecting Uncle Sam's pocketbook. He has a supply officer to manage his supply problems and keep the required records, but the manner in which these problems are managed and the accuracy of the records in reflecting the property status of the command (accountability) become a part of command responsibility.

As an aid in determining what and how much should be carried by a unit, the new procedures provide that each commanding officer will cause to be prepared an allowance list for his unit. This allowance list may consist of the following subdivisions:

T/E items over \$25.00 (custody cards required).

Items required for combat operations.

Encampment-garrison items authorized by T/E's.

Garrison type items required only for base or station use.

T/E items under \$25.00 (custody cards not required).

Items required for combat operations.

Encampment-garrison items authorized by T/E's.

Garrison type items required only for base or station use.

Consumable supplies and repair

parts (90 per cent of the supplies) will be stocked in accordance with usage history. Item deficiencies on the allowance lists will be excellent indicators of a unit's readiness for mounting-out.

No longer do commanders wait for supply issues until requisitions have been approved by unit "fiscal" officers and then screened, edited, verified and dropped from the stock record control cards by the supply officers. This procedure was called "pre-posting" and some old timers, fearful of the Damocles sword of fiscal and supply accountability, wouldn't release the supplies desired until all the fiscal and supply accountable paper processing obstacles had been successfully negotiated by the requesting unit. The rules and regulations were voluminous and the old timer, to protect himself from over-eager auditors and inspectors, minutely checked and recorded each and every requisitioning document before the supply issues were made.

The Supply Department, through the new supply accounting procedures, directs that all types of supplies, except T/E items with a unit cost of over \$25.00, be issued immediately without formal invoice and that the supply and fiscal paper work for such transactions be accomplished after the issues are made. This is called "post-posting", a procedure which has been advocated for some time by the Supply Department.

This procedure places responsibility on the unit commanders for correct requisitioning of all requirements. Supplies are issued without pre-verification of stock numbers, without reference to allowance lists, and without processing through the supply office stock record cards. This immediacy of supply action is commonly referred to as "over the counter issue." On presentation of an informal, hand written supply request to the supply stockman, the supplies are issued. Only requests for custodial type items, T/E items over \$25.00, will require review prior to issue.

The new procedures eliminate the submission of the Monthly Financial Analysis Statement. This report periodically required the balancing and price extension of approximate-



Col Morgan was commissioned in the Marine Corps in January of 1936 after resigning his commission in the Army Reserve. Sent to Guam in 1941, he was captured by the Japanese and interned as a POW. After WWII he served as CO of Replacement Bn and H&S Bn, Camp Lejeune, N. C. In 1950 he attended Senior School and upon graduation; was assigned as Supply Officer and Chief of Staff, Depot of Supplies, San Francisco. He is presently serving as Assistant Commander, Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia.

ly 40,000 stock record cards for divisions, 20,000 for wings, and 5 to 10,000 for regiments, aircraft groups, and separate battalions and squadrons. Furthermore the new procedures eliminate the preparation of thousands of vouchers which were required to be forwarded monthly to a Field Property Accounting Office for a detailed audit as to dollar and cent correctness.

In lieu of precise monetary accounting and control, the new procedures provide for item control. Simple entries on stock record cards now show issues to lower units with a brief reference to an informal requisition number for non-custodial type items which have been expended on issue, or to an invoice number for custodial type items which have been invoiced. The time consuming preparation of vouchers to support the issues of non-custodial type items (all consumables, all repair parts and all T/E items under \$25.00) has been eliminated.

Instead of the Monthly Financial Analysis Statement, a semiannual report of the dollar value of custodial type items will be rendered. This report will be coordinated with the semiannual Selected Item Inventory Report required by the Department of the Defense.

The old ways of recording "due outs" for consumable supplies requisitioned, but not on hand at time of request, have also been eliminated. Formerly, supply clerks would get lost in recording numerous back orders for common consumable supplies and just as frequently the back order entries were never liquidated when the customer actually got his supplies. The customer had little faith in such a system because of the delays and uncertainties involved. He would continue to requisition the item until it became available without regard for the fact that back order issues to him were pyramiding on the stock record cards far beyond his actual needs. It is apparent that such a system leads to chaos.

With "over the counter issues" for repair parts, consumable and expendable items (non-custodial) only those specified supplies required by a specific unit for a specific job will be recorded as a back order. Requests for supplies which are common to all units of the command will be re-

ferred back for resubmission at a time when the supplies are anticipated; the deficiencies will be immediately reported to the procurement desk and supplies sufficient for the entire command will be expeditiously requested from the next higher supply echelon.

The new procedures emphasize the importance of the easy flow of repair part components from one echelon of maintenance and supply to another. Provisions have been made for an immediate exchange of an unserviceable assembly or sub-assembly requiring 3d or 4th echelon maintenance, by a lower echelon of repair direct with a higher one. The paper work formerly required to effect these direct exchanges of components has been reduced to a simple statistical charge by a hand prepared slip of paper. This charge slip is forwarded direct from the shop store effecting the issue to the fiscal office charged with preparing management cost reports.

It is now recognized that a handwritten (printed) document is just as acceptable as a meticulously pre-

pared typewritten document. Formerly, roughs were first prepared by hand and then the data was transposed by typewriter to final document; a process which could take as long as several weeks, depending upon the availability of typewriters and typists. Now a requisition, an invoice or a voucher of any type, may be hand printed in lieu of typewritten

Marine officers read and hear much these days about the necessity to lighten the load. In all cases the references we read apply to the weight and cube of an FMF outfit. Equally important is the necessity to lighten the paper work load. Less red tape fits in as much with our new deployment concepts as do jet aircraft and helicopters. Less paper work in supply procedures means faster supply action. It will always be a challenge to improve on our supply action, and one sure way is through the reduction and simplification of paper work. We have taken some big strides forward through the new supply accounting procedures—*Let's Keep Going!*

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BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

The US Navy in Korea . . .

THE SEA WAR IN KOREA—Cdr M. W. Cagle, USN, and Cdr F. A. Manson, USN; 555 pages, illustrated; US Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. \$6.00

Here we have a vivid account of the many operations and missions which in total add up to an essential and substantial Navy contribution to the United Nations efforts in Korea from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953.

This book is more than a recitation of factual data, however; in it the authors have combined fact and analysis to produce a volume which those interested in either the political or military aspects of the Korean War will find absorbing.

In their search for significant details the authors have interviewed the top commanders who served with the United Nations forces in Korea. Thus the book is interspersed with the candid opinions of Gen MacArthur, Gen Van Fleet, Gen O. P. Smith, Adm Joy, Adm Struble, Adm Doyle and many others. Some of the views expressed, appear here for the first time. In addition, excerpts from the more important documents concerning command relationships and similar matters have been included.

Marines will find this book of particular interest for 2 reasons. First, because the discussion of the Inchon landing is a lucid and convincing exposition of the validity and importance of the amphibious operation and, second, because the authors pull no punches in their evaluation of the effectiveness of close air support as conducted by the Marine Corps and Navy vis-a-vis that conducted by the Air Force.

In regard to Inchon, the authors properly point out that the element of "luck" has perhaps been accorded too much credit for the universally acclaimed success of the landing. While not discounting the smile of fortune, the "skill, training, readiness and courage of the men of the US Navy and Marine Corps who made it possible" is recognized. Included is Adm Doyle's tribute to the Marines wherein he states that "because of their many years of specialized training in amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, only the United States Marines had the requisite know-how to formulate these

plans within the limited time available and to execute these plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal. . . . All these facts emphasize the soundness of our national policy in entrusting to the Navy and Marine Corps the specialization in, and development of amphibious warfare."

In short, the authors have convincingly set forth the significance of the Inchon landing, both as a splendid example of the mobility and flexibility of naval power properly applied, and as a shot in the arm for the Marine Corps. They conclude that the "incomparable achievement of the Marines at Inchon demonstrated in clearest terms the need of an adequate and every-ready Corps."

Gen MacArthur's little known role as a latter-day Marine Corps protagonist is fully revealed. It is pointed out that in the first 30 days of the war he sent a total of 6 dispatches to Washington requesting the Marines; in his estimation, the result of the Inchon landing would make certain the permanence of the Marine Corps in the United States military establishment.



Also recounted are the difficulties faced by the Navy in clearing the Soviet-laid minefields with a detailed account of the Wonsan clearing operation in 1950. Other events of interest which are related in detail include the bombing of the Korean side of the Yalu bridges, the attack on the Suiho hydroelectric plant, the F9F5 encounter with MIGs, presumed to be flown by Russians from fields in the vicinity of Vladivostok, and the two and one-half year naval "seige" of Wonsan.

The book is well documented and reflects the writing craftsmanship of 2 naval officers who have practical experience in which their professional success matched their literary achievements. Cdr Cagle is an aviator, Cdr Manson a surface sailor. Both have contributed to various professional and other periodicals.

Because it covers the entire 3-year

period, the book is necessarily long. The format and subdivisions, however, make it easy to locate portions which may be of particular interest. The authors have attempted to lend significance for, and advantages of, modern naval power. In this they have been successful.

Reviewed by LtCol J. F. Lawrence

Ed: A member of the CMC's Marine Corps Board, LtCol Lawrence was at Inchon with the 2d Bn, 7th Marines.

The Blue Diamond . . .

HELMET FOR MY PILLOW—Robert Leckie; 312 pages, non-illustrated; Random House, Inc., N. Y. \$3.95

Robert Leckie, ex-private, USMC (for that appears to have been his grade off and on for a majority of his total Marine career), has belatedly offered his war memoirs in *Helmet For My Pillow*, a combination of true and distorted observations. The book is a chronological and detailed narrative of the author's experiences and reactions from his entry into the Marine Corps at New York, through Parris Island and New River, and then the campaigns of Guadalcanal, Melbourne (so described as to merit the status of a campaign), New Guinea, New Britain and Peleliu, ending with his final discharge. Covering his entire Marine career, both its highs and its lows, it thus represents a vivid and interesting study of a representative type of WW II Marine. Not all readers will have the same reaction to his personal story.

For "Blue Diamond" veterans, it will recall to mind nostalgic memories, vivid to all, amusing to some, and irritating to many for its intensive and obvious attempts to belittle and besmirch anything and anyone in a position of higher authority or responsibility than the self-esteeming author himself. The personal narrative benefits from the author's alleged experiences, remembered with amazingly accurate detail, and related after years of literary experience, representing in published form, a highly readable account that records the thoughts and actions of not one, but many brains under the slandered but efficient helmets of war.

More important from the author's and publisher's point of view is the book's appeal to the general public. This reviewer believes it will appeal, for not only is it a well-written and rela-

tively accurate account of a small but interesting portion of history, but also it will please that large segment of people who like to see authority lambasted and ridiculed.

To believe the author, one would have to wonder how the Marines won their portion of the war, and yet they did. Perhaps it was fortunate that the entire Corps was not composed of people of the same emotional and psychological ilk of the author. Wars are fought by men with the physical ability and mental ingenuity that the author professes to have possessed, but they are won by nations that can provide the moral fiber needed to guide those men to victory.

There are undoubtedly minor discrepancies in detail, but these matter not in an overall assessment of the book. The major deficiency, to this reviewer, is the utter subjectivity of the narration, the traditional "everyone is out of step but me" attitude. Three present-day Generals of the Marine Corps, and other ranking officers and NCOs presently on duty, the author's commanders during his stay with H-2-1, illustrate that, unless the entire philosophy of the Marine Corps is wrong, the leadership under which he suffered was not quite so bumbling and inept as he endeavors to portray. In a final, dramatic attempt at objectivity, the author's epilogue presents his ideas on why men fight and what they gain. It is hoped that his gain, his "priceless heritage" for his son, is more than the total of the thoughts the book expresses. Further, his idea of sacrifice as the reason for fighting does not ring true. It is true that "they do not go to kill," for that is but a part of the reason, but it is not true that "they go to be killed, to risk their flesh, to insert their precious persons in the path of destruction." Were it merely an act of sacrifice, there are easier ways and nations at war would have few volunteers. Finally, he even works in an apology for the atomic bomb, but the reviewer hasn't figured this one out yet. Reference to the bomb in terms of megatons is the last of perhaps many exaggerations in the book.

(May the opportunity be taken to apologize to Melbourne, Australia, whose citizens aided in nursing the 1st MarDiv back to health, and who provided all manner of entertainment and hospitalities to the Marines, not just the sordid pleasures so easily found in any city by the always-present thrill-seekers, which the book portrays.)

Reviewed by LtCol G. B. Gierhart

Ed: As a member of the 1st Marines, LtCol Gierhart participated in the Guadalcanal, "Melbourne," and New Britain campaigns.

Limited War . . .

LIEUTENANT IN ALGERIA by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber; Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1957, 231 pages. \$3.50

The story of any war can seldom be told without some reference to the political issues in conflict. In large wars where the total energies of the belligerent countries are engaged, the fundamental issue is that of life or death. This issue can be proclaimed by mass propaganda so that everything connected with the war becomes either black or white; good or bad. A narrative of such a war can confine itself to the drama of combat without other explanation.

The story of limited war, a fashionable term used to denote a conflict somewhat less violent than global war, cannot be so easily treated. The political issues in limited war cannot be simplified and made to fit into convenient categories for public consumption. The basic issue is seldom national survival, and the people who pay the price in men and money for such a war do not respond to simple slogans.

In these times when both the Free World and the Communist Bloc enjoy the capability of destroying one another, the chance of global war appears to be waning. However, limited war continues



to be possible and in fact becomes ever more likely. For this reason it is essential that the problem of limited war be carefully analyzed. Not only must the technique of the actual fighting be studied, but also the manner in which the political problems enter into play must be clearly exposed.

Servan-Schreiber's recent book, *Lieutenant in Algeria*, is a particularly timely work on the limited war in Algeria; the only such war now actually being fought. He provides, in the narration of his experiences during 6 months as an officer in Algeria, enough data on combat tactics to indicate the magnitude of the military problem. But, perhaps of even greater importance, he details the tremendous influence of the political issues in the conduct of a "small war." Thirty-three year old Servan-

Schreiber applies to his task a flair for simple writing gained as a newspaperman and editor of the Paris paper *L'Express*. He unfolds a complex story in a manner which easily captures the reader. This is fascinating adventure at its best; at the same time it is a piercing analysis of France's dilemma.

The rebellion in Algeria began late in 1954, just in time to provide new tasks to the French contingents returning from Indochina. Initially it appeared that the terror launched by the adherents of the political party called the "Front de la Liberation Nationale" (FLN) could be put down in short order. Today this optimism has long been abandoned, and 400,000 French troops are engaged in a bitter struggle with some 50,000 assorted rebels at a cost to France of four million dollars per day. This drain of man power and wealth has had severe repercussions both in France and in the role France plays in the western alliance. The war in Algeria has greatly reduced France's contribution to the military forces in NATO. It has raised economic and political issues at home which are not yet resolved and which already have been responsible for the fall of several governments. It has created conflicts within the French Army and exposed divergencies in French public opinion and in the opinion of the world at large.

The war in Algeria is characterized by the absence of any front lines or any visible enemy. A soldier can lose his life as readily at a sidewalk cafe in Algiers as in a convoy on a lonely mountain road. Since the enemy is an Arab and since it is so difficult to find in the mass of the Arab population the small minority who are the FLN, all Arabs are suspect. This tendency to simplify the identity of the enemy is exploited by the FLN who fight by terror.

There are one million Europeans in Algeria, the majority of whom were born in that country. A number of these find it difficult to consider any solution to the war which would place their holdings in jeopardy or possibly subject them to a local government which the eight million natives would control. To this group there can be added a military element which views the solution to the problem in Algeria merely as one requiring increased violence. These extremist elements are actually encouraged by the FLN who see in any French attempt to consider all Arabs as enemies their one hope of fusing the Arabs of Algeria into a truly homogeneous majority ultimately capable of throwing the French out of the country. Thus the FLN murder the pro-French Arab, the Arab who fails to contribute to the

FLN fund, the Arab who sympathizes with the more moderate native party called the "Mouvement National Algerien," and the Frenchman who calls for moderation in the conflict.

In opposition to the proponents of violence there are Frenchmen who recognize that the ultimate solution to the war lies in the recognition of the Arab as a man capable of contributing to the development of his country. There are indications that this enlightened element is gaining ground. The French have embarked on a program to better the physical surroundings of the Arabs and the Army is waging its war with ever more carefully limited violence. Yet as long as the war continues, blood and treasure will be spent and as long as Algeria suffers so will France.

Servan-Schreiber offers no solution. He states the many facets of the problem, shows how the path toward uncontrolled violence will lead to fascism and to a renunciation of the political ideologies that made France great. He suggests that only by gaining the confidence of the Arab will the war in Algeria end. In his careful account of the realities of the situation in Algeria he brings into sharp focus a tragedy which has been obscured by conflicting reports. *Lieutenant in Algeria* has a prominent place among the more informative books of the day.

Reviewed by Col V. J. Croizat

Ed: Col Croizat served in Indochina and recently returned from Algeria where his observations resulted in *The Algerian War* (GAZETTE: Dec '57).

The Sioux at Little Big Horn . . .


CUSTER'S FALL, The Indian Side of the Story, by David Humphreys Miller; Duell, Sloan and Pierce. \$4.50

In a day and age when impartial news gathering agencies were unheard of, and current news was invariably slanted to suit the editorial policies of the newspaper publishers, George Armstrong Custer led the 7th Cavalry against Sitting Bull and the Sioux nation. When the results of this battle hit the newspapers, the facts were so misconstrued and feelings were so aroused, that even today it is referred to as "Custer's Massacre." By no meaning of the word was it a massacre, but history is slow to assemble all the facts and draw true conclusions. For over 80 years the accounts of this battle have been shrouded in mystery and filled with inaccuracies.

One source of information about the battle has been largely ignored until now—the Indians themselves. David Humphreys Miller has seen to it that this source shall not go unrecorded. He has interviewed 71 Indians who participated in the battle and has spent 22

years in compiling their stories. Since the Indians of the 1800's had no way of writing their languages, all history was passed on by word of mouth. Conversations with these old warriors were carried on in their own language.

The value of this book lies in the little individual stories pieced together to tell a larger and more important story. Who will not be surprised to learn that Custer, contrary to many paintings and accounts, was one of the first to fall at Little Big Horn? Maj Reno, who bore the onus of Custer's defeat for years, emerges as an unstable officer in combat, but hardly deserving of all the shameful charges he took with him to the grave. Eventually cleared of wilful disobedience of orders, the taint of cowardice and dishonor remained. Custer is depicted as a man whose intense desire for personal glory (including an attempt to discredit President Grant and become president himself) dictated his every move.



The military student should be forewarned that he will find no tactical message; no professional appraisal of the battle. The author's use of the colorful Indian names (Drags-the-Rope, Hairy Moccasin, White-Man-Runs-Him) is excessive. It is often difficult to follow the train of thought in a sentence punctuated by 3 or 4 of these names. While some will not agree with all the author's conclusions, and others, most certainly, will object to the level of literary style used, it would be unfair to let these opinions obscure the dark spots which this book illuminates.

The interesting personal stories revealed and the opportunity to view the battle through the eyes of the hostiles, will compensate the reader for his time.

Reviewed by Maj Clyde B. Shropshire

Ed: *The history of the old West has been a hobby of Maj Shropshire's for many years.*

Reminiscences of a Confederate Cavalryman . . .

KENTUCKY CAVALIERS IN DIXIE—

George Dallas Mosgrove; edited by Bell Irvin Wiley; 281 pages; illustrated; McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., Jackson, Tenn. \$6.00

As the centennial of the Civil War approaches, there is a growing interest in this period of our history, not only

among historians but also among the general public. One consequence of this interest is an ever increasing flood of new books on the subject. These books cover all imaginable aspects of the conflict. Authors are constantly searching for new material. A lucrative source of this material is the original writings of the participants, such as their diaries and letters, or perhaps their reminiscences written after the fact.

The McCowat-Mercer Press, of Jackson, Tennessee, specializes in tapping these original sources. Bell Irvin Wiley, the editor of McCowat-Mercer, and his colleagues have come up with much interesting material in the past. *Kentucky Cavaliers in Dixie or The Reminiscences of a Confederate Cavalryman* is their latest to be published. The author of these reminiscences, George Dallas Mosgrove, was a regimental clerk in the 4th Kentucky Cavalry, CSA. For long periods during the war, he also clerked at the brigade headquarters in which his regiment served. In 1894, some 30 years after the war, he wrote down his memories of the experiences of himself, his regiment and the various brigades of which it was a part. Originally published in Louisville in 1895, this volume covers Confederate cavalry actions in Eastern Tennessee, Kentucky and in Southwestern Virginia. It contains interesting first hand accounts of such noted Confederates as Gen John Hunt Morgan, John C. Breckinridge, Simon Bolivar Buckner and Humphrey Marshall, as well as many less well known Southern soldiers. His accounts of battles and camp life are sprinkled with absorbing and humorous anecdotes and personality sketches.

In editing *Kentucky Cavaliers*, Bell Irvin Wiley has provided a 20-page introduction which is an excellent review and summary of the book. He has also supplied many interesting illustrations, several appendices and an index. All of these are helpful to the modern reader. Essentially, however, this remains the original reminiscences. It has not been altered. It is rambling and disjointed; the style is flowery and antiquated. Except for those events that Mosgrove participated in personally, it is not always historically accurate. Yet it catches the atmosphere of the times and the spirit of the Confederate cavalry. To those with a more than passing interest in the Civil War it will prove an interesting contribution to the writings about that period.

Reviewed by LtCol C. T. Earnest, USA

Ed: *A member of the Civil War Round Table LtCol Earnest is the Army Liaison Officer at MCLFDC (Development Center) MCS, Quantico.*

The Confederacy . . .

THE LAND THEY FOUGHT FOR—
Clifford Dowdey. Doubleday, NY.
438 pages with index. \$5.75

This story of the Confederacy is another in the "Mainstream of America" series of historical books.

Mr. Dowdey, who is a noted writer on the Civil War, takes on a large order in a single volume. He attempts to describe the events leading up to the Civil War to give the reader some background on its cause, both political and sociological. He then traces the highlights of the war in a most interesting fashion by an analysis of battles and leaders.

This is a well written book and held my interest throughout. To be sure this is a subject that has enjoyed the attention of many researchers and writers over the years. However, it is the aim of this present historical series of which this book forms a part, to write history for everyone's reading enjoyment. This, the author has achieved.

Since the book is essentially a story of the South, many readers will take exception to the author's analysis of the war. First, he tries to determine how 90 per cent of the Southerners who did not own slaves and others who disbelieved in the institution, like Lee and Jackson, could have become so antagonized and united as to explode in a clash of arms. It's not easy to determine the roots of a quarrel which, "like a baton in a relay race was passed on from generation to generation until the men who settled it in bloody violence had little notion of what started it."

It is in his analysis of events, through the personalities of the men who figured in them, that the author particularly excels. For example, his sketch on John C. Calhoun brings out vividly the turbulence of political events leading up to the armed struggle. From a man who held promise as a future US President and of whom it was once said that, "When Calhoun took snuff, South Carolina sneezed," this statesman was, in 2 years' time, broken physically and mentally and resigned from the Vice-Presidency in his desperate plight of being forced to choose between his state and his nation. From this same crucible came Jefferson Davis who served his nation well as a Secretary of War under President Pierce, but was to serve the cause of the Confederacy badly as its President. The imprint of his personality runs throughout the book and he emerges as a small man who became constantly more detached from his people and who never appreciated his own limitations, believing until his death that he had been right in everything he ever did.

The military personality sketches are

of equal interest. Lee emerges as a man who, in spite of certain shortcomings, was so great in spirit and dedicated to duty that he was truly a heroic figure. Stonewall Jackson was a man who studied Napoleon as he studied the Bible and was of strictest punctuality, exactitude in work, secrecy, and had a blind devotion to duty which made his body tireless and his mind questionless. In a strange attraction of opposites, great affection developed between Jeb Stuart and him. Stuart is described as vain and showy, but a man of vast self confidence, superb at reconnaissance; aggressive, meticulous and intuitive. Others who are critically analyzed include: Joe Johnston who started his career retreating at Manassas and finished it retreating in North Carolina; Beauregard, the gorgeous Creole who loved to make grandiose plans in the manner of a field marshal which bore no relation to realities; Braxton Bragg whose fine qualities of mind were outweighed by his irascibility and penchant for antagonizing people; "Bald Dick" Ewell, a generous man without jealousy or vain-glory whose sole purpose was to serve the South; Longstreet, a blunt burly man, stolidly self-assured, opinionated and jealous of others.

The author shows little disposition toward kindness in his description of northern generals. Sherman emerges as "a symbol of the wanton and ruthless brutality of a might which denied all human rights to its victims." Others include: Sheridan, an undersized man (5'3") with an oversize head who was definitely anything but a Rock at Chickamauga; Burnside, more famous for his whiskers than his generalship; Hooker, vain-glorious, but tough, and "Unconditional Surrender" Grant who, while not credited with great generalship, is described as one who never made war on civilians or conceived of himself as a God of Vengeance or directed his army toward purposeless destruction of human property.

This story of the men and events during the troubled life of the Confederacy is well worth a reading. The author brings most of the issues into clear focus so that the reader can achieve a better understanding of the period and feel something of the emotion which the people must have felt as they read Robert E. Lee's last General Order on the occasion of the surrender to Grant, "With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your Country, and grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration of myself, I bid you all an affectionate farewell—." Reviewed by LtCol H. W. Edwards Ed: An instructor at Senior School, LtCol Edwards was head of Historical Branch, HQMC.

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A total of \$1,500.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1958 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in three classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
 - a) On the title page of the essay.
 - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
 - c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1958.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

DEADLINE 1 OCTOBER 1958

The Marine Corps Association